Do Close Elections Boost Voter Turnout?

In this week's reading, researchers Ashenfelter and Kelley did not find that "perceived closeness" of a political race had any statistically-significant relationship to voters' probability of casting their ballots (Mueller, 311). Feeling a duty or obligation to vote had a much stronger impact. Later in the chapter, Mueller described a separate study also conducted in 1975. Researchers Tollison, Crain, and Paulter did report importance in "perceived closeness," especially in states with large newspaper circulation. Mueller quoted them on page 319: “Information concerning the expected outcome [tends] to make more people vote in close races." 

I considered how people have constant access to news today. Now that we can no longer escape the headlines, if the public is inundated with predictions that a race is neck-in-neck, will that information motivate them to head to the ballot box? The National Bureau of Economic Research published a paper in 2017 that did find a causal effect of "anticipated election closeness" on voter turnout; the findings "indicate that information about an election’s competitiveness can shape political behavior." The paper speculates that if the media hadn't predicted a Democratic landslide in 2016, the outcome of the presidential election may have been different.  The American Psychological Association highlighted a similar study on their website with identical findings — "voter turnout increases when polls predict a close race." 

How this will affect the 2020 general election, no one can say yet. But those hoping for one candidate's victory should steer clear of painting it as an inevitability.  

Johnson's Theory of Rational Abstention Further Validates that Conservative Voting Restrictions are Unreasonable

An article just released by Vox News, recounts Chief Justice John Roberts' long "crusade" against certain provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) which climaxed with him leading the Supreme Court in striking down the section of the VRA that required states with a history of implementing racist voting restrictions to be pre-cleared by the federal government before implementing any new voting restrictions. This decision was important because the lack of preclearance has now allowed states such as North Carolina to implement voting restrictions that have in some cases, as a Federal Appeals Courts stated, targeted "African American [voters] with almost surgical precision" (Vox, 2020). 

While it is understandable for their to be some restrictions to limit widespread voter fraud, restrictions beyond those that come as a result of registering to vote and keeping up-to-date voter rolls to prevent someone from voting in two separate states or voting for a deceased relative, are unreasonable. This is because as Johnson concludes in his chapter on Voting, Rational Abstention, and Rational Ignorance, many Americans already chose not to vote because the opportunity cost of voting once is larger than the benefit and therefore, the opportunity cost of attempting to vote more than once must be even larger than the benefit of doing so. And therefore, this large opportunity cost acts as a disincentive to even attempt to commit voter fraud.  

As Johnson writes, the opportunity cost of doing even the simplest tasks such as driving to the polling place and waiting in line to cast a ballot far outweigh the possible benefit that that single vote could bring the voter; especially when considering the low probability that that single vote will decide the outcome of the election. So if we consider the fact that 1) there is a low probability that there will ever be enough rational voters in a given election who would use their time and money to figure out how to vote more than once, to the swing an election, 2) that there is also a low probability that someone can successfully vote more than once even without restrictions such as voter ID laws, and 3) that there are costly penalties for anyone caught committing voter fraud; the cost, when considering potential civil penalties, and opportunity cost, when considering the forgone leisure and work time, of successfully committing voter fraud are much too large for a rational voter to even consider attempting it. Therefore, voting restrictions beyond those that come with the identification process of registering to vote and keeping updated voter rolls, are unnecessary. And as has recently been the case in states such as Georgia, voting restrictions have in fact disenfranchised the limited amount of people who actually choose to vote, despite the high opportunity cost of doing so; and even may have increased the opportunity cost of voting.

Group Gifts and Free Riding

 This weekend I was with my parents at brunch when they reminded me about how in High School at the end of every sports season there was always a coaches gift. I never thought much of this but now, analyzing the situation with an economic lens, I can now see how large the threat of free riding is in this kind of scenario. Group gifts allow you to benefit the same amount whether you donate nothing or a sizable amount, because the gift recipient cannot differentiate between those who contributed versus those who did not. 

This is a real world example of the limitations of the Coase Theorem. It is non-excludable meaning you cannot exclude anyone from the enjoyment of being part of the gift giving group unless you were to list out the contributing individuals, which is social taboo. It is also non-rival, meaning that one individual's contribution does not limit another's ability to contribute. This is an example of market failure because the group gift will be underproduced; people can contribute less and hide behind the shield of saying "it's from all of us."

The Potential Externalities of Amazon's HQ2

The discussion of externalities in this class reminded me of an issue we discussed in my Urban Economics class: the externalities of Amazon’s HQ2. Specifically, the issue debated is whether cities should bid for large firms or if new firm locations should be chosen by the free market alone.

Believing the costs to outweigh the benefits, many argue that cities should not bid for companies to open new offices in their area. One potential drawback are congestion costs. These negative externalities of production are inconveniences brought about by the firm’s opening. As more and more people move in to work at Amazon’s HQ2, Northern Virginia will likely see a higher cost of housing, greater commuting times, and increased noise pollution. The marginal cost to society will be higher than Amazon’s private cost because the only cost the corporation will face is the cost of opening. While Amazon’s HQ2 will bring in higher paying jobs, many predict that the benefits will occur mainly to the wealthy and educated, while rising housing costs will threaten to displace the middle and lower classes in Northern Virginia. 

However, there is another externality to consider that may suggest “bidding” has a positive role to play. According to Greenstone et al. (2008), a new firm location can create a positive externality of production; the opening of a new firm may raise productivity in nearby firms in similar industries. This effect results from several factors. Multiple firms located together may allow workers from different companies to interact and share knowledge. Additionally, with more of the city’s employees working in the same industry, companies will be able to find a better match for their positions. Following this logic, municipalities should bid for new firm locations when they have preexisting companies that they expect would become more productive. Bidding incentivizes the firm to choose a location that produces the productivity bump over a location that does not and provides a subsidy to the firm for their positive externality. The question remaining is whether it is reasonable to expect other DC area tech companies to experience this productivity gain from Amazon’s arrival. 

Are Virginians Irrational Voters?

Earlier this week, Virginia was one of the first states to start in-person voting. Despite being about 50 days from the election, voters came out in mass to cast their votes. In Fairfax County, there were hundreds of people in line, who waited up to four hours to vote (!!). Hearing of these events throughout Virginia made me think of the Johnson reading and his argument that rational, self-interested individuals do not vote. 

The income lost by waiting four hours will most likely not be greater than the benefits of casting an individual vote (MC>MB). A minimum wage worker would have cost of $7.25*4=$29, which is significantly larger than the pennies of benefit from a national election. A rational actor would then weigh these cost and benefits and decide not to vote. However, clearly these people believe they received significant benefit, or they would not have wasted their time. The chances of these votes swinging the election are abysmal, especially in a blue dominated county. So why do it? 

One explanation could be the social pressure to vote. Especially in Northern Virginia, being politically active is a determinate of social positioning and respect. Having the ability to tell coworkers, neighbors, etc. that they were so dedicated to democracy that they waited 4 hours to vote may be a source of social capital. I think that Johnson would agree that these voters are more motivated by the private rationality of saying they voted than the actual impact of their vote. That is, the greatest benefit they get isn't from who wins, but rather from saying they did their civic duty to vote in this critical election.

 

 

Mask Wearing and Collective Action

   This past week I had a repairman come out to my home to fix my internet. As I went out to meet him with my mask on, he said "Oh, let me go back to my truck and get my mask." This interaction helped me appreciate the value of the masks mandates that have been passed around the country since mask-wearing for individuals that are not in high-risk populations is a public good. Most young adults are at low risk and do not individually benefit from wearing masks. I know that while I personally wore one before the statewide mandate, I found it annoying and would have preferred if I could have not worn it. This creates an instance of the Prisoner's Dilemma for those at low-risk: the individual doesn't feel like their mask-wearing contributes much to the public's health so they are less inclined to wear one, yet everyone is better off if we all wear masks.

  Governor Northam passed one of the 20+ mask mandates currently in effect across the country at the end of May. This requirement forces collective action from Virginians, effectively moving to a Pareto-efficient allocation of mask-wearing. In practice, this has led to higher levels of mask-wearing among low-risk individuals, leading to those at high-risk being better protected, and overall raising the public's wellness. This has translated to lower COVID-19 rates per capita compared to no-mandate states, demonstrating that the government's use of a mandate to force collective action is indeed a Pareto improvement, saving lives in the process. The mandates have proven to be a good example of when government intervention is necessary to get closer to allocative efficiency.