Trump's Political Irrationality At Work

On Tuesday night, watching the presidential debate, it didn't take long for me to notice that neither candidate had a lot of interest in being fully transparent about their platforms. In particular, there was a moment when President Trump was asked if he was willing to condemn white supremacy, and his response was "Sure, I’m prepared to do it. I would say- I would say, almost everything I see is from the left-wing, not from the right wing... I'm willing to do anything I want to see peace." When pressed further to condemn white supremacists, he said "Proud Boys, stand back and stand by. But I'll tell you what, I'll tell you what, somebody's got to do something about antifa and the left because this is not a right-wing problem. This is a left-wing problem." 

Trump did not say "I condemn white supremacy in all its forms" or anything like that. He knew he would alienate his most right-wing voters whose support he relies on to hope to win the election this year. He intentionally obscured his true beliefs by neither condemning white supremacy nor standing against the idea of condemning white supremacy altogether. That way, he can keep his right-wing support and still have a chance to capture voters in the middle. He further demonstrates his desire to capture those middle voters by responding to a question about white supremacy with "This is a left-wing problem", trying to use his platform to keep people from voting for his opponent. 

If Trump knows his voter base as well as I expect he does, it seems that this seemingly failed answer accomplished just what he wanted it to. He has applied Downs' idea that ambiguity in a political platform allows it to appeal to a broader number of voters, and he probably hasn't alienated anyone who didn't already disapprove of him. The New York Times even acknowledged that "there was no sign of a full Republican retreat from Mr. Trump" despite titling that very article "G.O.P. Alarmed by Trump’s Comments on Extremist Group, Fearing a Drag on the Party". The New York Times may be voicing some wishful thinking if they really think Trump didn't get away with another blatant display of racism. 

Unanimity Rule and COVID Safety

My whole life I have generally defaulted to using majority rule in my informal, social decision making. For example, if I am deciding where to do dinner with a group I may ask friends to "like" the text message for the restaurant they prefer and then select the restaurant with the most votes. While the 50% cut off involved in majority rule is fairly arbitrary, in low stakes decisions, like the restaurant example, people are generally comfortable with the ultimate selection just knowing that a greater number of their friends prefer it. Additionally, as people do not want to spend a great deal of time making informal decisions, they consent to cede some control and accept a decision rule that may at times place them in the minority with no way to change the outcome.

The coronavirus pandemic has overwhelmingly changed this "default" decision rule to one of unanimity even in informal, social settings. This is due to the significantly larger potential negative costs that could be incurred by a decision that is not in the favor of every single person in the group. For example, if a group of friends is deciding what activity to do this evening, they should must to the comfort and safety of the most cautious or vulnerable person in the group. If we assume that sitting out from the activity is not an option, people will not want to accept a lack of control over the decision making process even if it means more time and effort to work out a solution. As there is some level of uncertainty as to the safety preferences of everyone in the group, the rational individual (in a small group decision) would choose a unanimity decision rule to protect against the chance that their safety preferences are in the minority. 

Two Apartments, One Controls Heat

Some of my friends live in a duplex. They live in part of the house, and some other students live in the other part. During Charlottesville's recent cold weather, my friends found out that only their neighbors had control of the heating, and that the heating had been turned up uncomfortably high. This appears not to be a singular problem. My friends sent representatives to negotiate lower temperatures, but they are worried about the upcoming winter.

Upon hearing of this, my reaction was immediately of the Coase Theorem, and I told them that they would definitely be able to come to an agreeable solution for both parts of the house. The property rights are clearly delineated. Transaction costs are low, since they live in the same house. They will easily be able to approach their neighbors, explain the problem, and find the price such that their neighbors' marginal benefit from payment will exceed the marginal cost to them of keeping the thermostat lower. In fact, even if the situation were reversed and my friends controlled the heat, a deal could still be reached, as their neighbors would then be willing to pay them to raise the house's temperature. It is unfortunate that my friends would have to pay extra money to be able to control the temperature in their house. However, they also told me one other thing that ensures their neighbors will be willing to compromise: my friends have the power to shut off the duplex's water.

A Failed Attempt to Exclude

 Recently, a couple of friends and I went fishing on the Moorman's river, about a half hour away from Grounds. As we drove up there, one of my friends informed me that in order to fish on the river, I technically needed to have a fishing license, but that it wouldn't be a problem if I didn't. Once we arrived at the trailhead to get to our fishing spot, it became very clear that no one was going to stop me from being on the trail, fishing on the river, or generally doing whatever I wanted while I was there. The gates were wide open, and even if it were closed there was a clear path where people regularly walk around it. Though I've only been a couple of times, there has never once been any sort of officer or ranger monitoring the area to ensure everyone follows protocol. 

The state had half-heartedly tried to exclude this public good and failed. There was a requirement to purchase a fishing/hunting license through a complex process involving many fees from about $10 up to over $200. However, since the good was not excludable in its current state, and one person's use of the trail does not decrease the utility I get out of being on it, it can be looked at as a public good and I am completely disincentivized to pay for a license. I enjoy free riding and so does everyone else, so either the state needs to increase the excludability of the river, or accept its use as a public good.

Is Trump the Country's Biggest Free Rider?

According to a recent New York Times article, President Donald J. Trump only paid $750 in federal income taxes in 2016, another $750 his first year in office, and paid zero in federal income taxes in 10 of the last 15 years. This is despite the fact that, according to Investopedia, Americans have paid $1.4 billion a year to keep the president well cared for and protected. And if we consider the protection and care of the presidency non-excludeable and non-rival public good because the benefits of a well protected president, most notably a stable government, and the benefits of a well run executive branch, are available to all tax-payers including the president, President Trump is underinvesting in this public good and therefore, is a free rider. 

What may make President Trump even more of a free rider is that though the protection of the presidency can be considered a public good, Trump has not only been the most direct beneficiary of such protection as other presidents have, but unlike other presidents, he has uniquely used his position as president to enrich his private businesses.

The Irrationality of the Electoral College

 

In “Voting, Rational Abstention, and Rational Ignorance” by Johnson, he claims that voting results do not necessarily reflect the will of the majority, but the preferences of those who went to the polls. However, because of the electoral college system of determining the presidential election, even those who go to the polls may not have their preferences reflected in the outcome. In the past twenty years, two of the five elections in the United States have ended with voters revealing their preferences for one candidate, yet the other taking victory due to the electoral college. That is, 40% of the presidential elections in the past two decades have resulted this way. Now, this is not an argument about the pros and cons of the electoral college, but rather the impact it may have on the incentive to vote in a presidential election and the utility derived from voting.

According to Johnson’s explanation, as long as expected marginal benefit (the probability that your vote is decisive) + some other beneficial reason for voting (social pressure, moral obligation, opportunity for expression, utility from the act of voting, minimax regret, etc.) exceed the cost of voting, then it may be rational to vote. We already know that in a presidential election, the marginal benefit from voting is infinitely minimal, and then, if the electoral college results of an election are different from the popular vote, many of the other reasons people vote can be discarded making it irrational to vote entirely. If there is a reasonable chance that the candidate who wins the popular vote, a direct reflection of the preferences of voters, loses the election, what incentives are left for people to vote in presidential elections? If the candidate who wins the popular vote does not win the electoral college, the utility from voting may be obsolete. There could be a high level of regret for even voting in the first place if your vote, which was represented in the popular vote, ended up being essentially worthless in the outcome of the election. As Jesse Wegman writes in the New York Times, “When every vote matters, more people vote”. I argue that by changing to a popular vote, rather than relying on the electoral college to determine a victor, there would be a greater incentive to vote and greater expected utility from voting knowing that citizens’ preferences will be properly represented every single time.