Polling: The Battle Against Rationality Continues

Responding to a poll, whether it is a political questionnaire or assessing a consumption good or service, is a costly enterprise for the rational consumer. Polls traditionally involve long phone calls, generally placed around dinner time when the family is sitting down to eat, and include very many questions regarding levels of satisfaction and premature opinions. Responding to these questions in a comprehensive way that accurately conveys how the voter feels can be a costly and time consuming matter. Furthermore, not everyone has a home phone and prefer to only carry cell phones, which may mean the results will not be representative of the entire population. In effect, the costs of polling have increased. However, the face of polling is changing. In 2012, Microsoft, through Xbox, conducted a presidential poll. Polls via text messages are going to be a new strategy to gather information, as well as polls via television, which allow the poller to skip ads to give information instead.

The question remains, however, if these new methods will be enough to make responding to polls worth while. Even though the new strategies are more convenient because they allow people to respond to questions on their own time, they still require the voter to take time out of their day to answer questions that may not even have an effect on political parties' platforms. The rational voter will still abstain unless the benefits are high enough to make it worth while, e.g. if they really hate ads.

Flip-Flopping and the Median Voter Theorem

In this video, Anderson Cooper addresses Obama's change of opinion on gay marriage. According to the clip, when Obama was running for a state senate election in Chicago, he indicated to his voters that he supported gay marriage. Years later when running for U.S. Senate, Obama announced that he was against gay marriage. Cooper asks his two guests on the show whether they think that this change of opinion was brought about by political motives, and both give answers that sound as if they were taken from a page from Buchanan and Tullock's piece on the median voter theorem. The first guest (6:04) notes that Obama was working with two different collections of voters: first, Chicago, which is a city that is "very progressive," and later, all of Illinois, which includes a wider and less overall progressive collection of opinions. The first guest explains that once Obama realized this shift in voter pools, he strategically announced his change of opinion of gay marriage. The second guest (7:05) agrees that Obama's declaration of his disapproval of gay marriage was a strategic one, but doubts that Obama used good strategy. The second guest thinks that Obama is misinterpreting the distribution of voters. According to the second guest, Americans are becoming more accepting of gay marriage than Obama has realized, and Obama is thus "falling behind the curve." This language used by both guests indicates that they think that Obama is considering the distributions of his voters and reacting to them in a strategic way.

The ideas of the second guest make me wonder if there can be a possible justification of political flip-flopping. In class, we hesitated to say (and some of us refused to say) that it is morally acceptable for a candidate to say that he supports Policy X when he sees that most of his voters support Policy X, and then immediately support policy ~X as soon as he wins the election. However, what if the distribution of voters during the election shows that most people support Policy X, then a gradual shift in general opinion shows that most people support Policy ~x a few years into the winning candidate's term? If the distribution of attitudes of voters can in fact change as drastically as Cooper's second guest seems to think, maybe it is justifiable for a candidate to change his opinions along with those of his people, or maybe not. The question then becomes: is it more important for a candidate to stand by his original opinion of the constitutionality of a certain issue, or for a candidate to match and serve the changing preferences of the people?

Nelson Mandela

Nelson Mandela is notorious for his illustrious political career, culminating in his election as the first President in post-Apartheid South Africa; his career can essentially be broken down into two stages, each of which is especially relevant to Downs' median voter theorem. During the first stage of his career, he spent 26 years in prison as a result of fighting the ensuing changes after "in 1948, the Afrikaner Nationalist party won the whites-only general election, and began to institute its policy of apartheid across South Africa." During this stage of his political career, his primary focus was on attaining suffrage for the non-white populace. The realization of his dream of an election open to voters of all races in 1994 effectively represented the appearance of a huge new mode on the voter preferences density function. The result was that the point at which the median voter lay on the policy spectrum was vastly different. Due to the immense size of the influx of new voters, the median voter was likely located extremely close to the new mode on the voter preferences density function. The second stage of his career was as an actual politician and party leader as he attempted to steer the proposed policies of his party toward the preferences of the new median voter. Ultimately, Mandela proved adept at identifying the preferences of the median voter as well as at advocating policies closest to those favored by the median voter, and consequently he won the Presidency.

Is he really the villain?

Venezuela is a two-party political system with a bimodal distribution near the extremes. The radical left is currently governed by President Nicolas Maduro, successor of Hugo Chavez. The right extreme, on the other hand, was originally lead by Henrique Capriles and it is now under the umbrella of Mr. Leopoldo Lopez. Guided by radically opposing ideologies, the Venezuelan population is divided in these two parties. The government advocates a socialist ideology, whereby the economy has experienced rocketing inflation, nationalization of private companies, plummeting currency, and increasingly short supply of food, medicine and other consumer products. Alternatively, the radical opposition believes in democracy and a free market economy.

Downs explains in his paper that a two-party system of this distribution will pose a threat to democracy: “whichever party wins will attempt to implement policies radically opposed to the other party’s ideology… This means that government policy will be highly unstable…” Indeed, after 14 years of an unstable socialist regime, the rightist mass demands the government to take action for fixing the economy and addressing social problems like insecurity. The problem lies in reaching a consensus on how the right should demand this government action.

Unlike Mr. Lopez, Henrique Capriles believes that protests and demonstrations will not achieve a change of government. Instead, he advocates for a legal electoral exit (scheduled for 2015). The extremist right is stronly criticizing Capriles, claiming he has submitted himself to the government by not supporting the opposition’s protests. But maybe Capriles is the one that understands Downs’ argument. Capriles is strategizing to move away from the radical right towards the medium-voter. While Maduro and Lopez are both hoping to increase their support at the extremes, Capriles is aiming to move voters to the center of the distribution by uniting the radical speeches under one goal: a future for Venezuela. If Downs’ political cycle holds true, then centralizing the population under a normal distribution is Venezuela’s best bet on exiting the black hole of a socialist revolution. 

War and the Median Voter Theorem

The Islamic State militant group has inflicted horrific amounts of damage to the people of Iraq. Although they have only become popular in American news media within the past month or two, the pain and suffering that the Islamic State militants are willing to cause is not news for the Commander in Chief. Many people accuse President Obama of acting too late against the Islamic State. This group has grown much larger and more powerful as it has taken over more cities in Iraq. It would have been easier to defeat the Islamic State if action had been taken earlier. However, taking action earlier would have resulted in less calamity. I believe that Americans support the War on Terror most when danger is clear. A large portion of Iraq losing control to the Islamic State has illustrated clear danger, whereas preventing the Islamic State from making gains would depict them as less of a threat. I think that recent news had changed voters' distribution when considering their support for fighting the Islamic State. Three months ago, much fewer voters would be willing to support this war than today. This means that the median voter has shifted in further support of the war due to the gains that the Islamic State has made. Acting against the Islamic State later rather than sooner makes the Democratic Party more representative of the median voter, due to escalated danger posed by the Islamic State. With a presidential election only two years away, the Democratic Party does not want to portray themselves as 'too right-winged,' which could lose them left-tailed voters as a punishment. I think that waiting to fight the Islamic State was a political move to help Democrats win more votes in the upcoming presidential election. Some people may believe that this is very unethical. However, if the Democrats believe that winning the Presidential election may provide a long run benefit that the Republicans would not provide, such as better policies on dealing with terror organizations, than the humanitarian cost of delaying action against the Islamic State may be worth the benefit of winning extra votes in the upcoming presidential election.

Paying people to vote?

The city of Los Angeles is considering paying its residents to vote, a proposal aimed at increasing voter turnout.  Last year, only 23.3% of eligible Los Angeles voters cast ballots, leading city officials to consider methods of incentivizing voting.  In his article “Voting, Rational Abstention, and Rational Ignorance,” Johnson argues that citizens do not vote because the cost of voting exceeds the expected benefits.  The costs involved in voting are numerous and include becoming educated on the candidates and issues, missing work, registering, waiting in line, and more.  The benefits derived from voting depend on the probability of casting a decisive vote, which in Los Angeles is basically zero.  However, the benefits of voting can increase when there is social pressure to vote but since turnout rates are so low, clearly the majority of people are not affected by this pressure.

The proposal to compensate citizens for casting a ballot would clearly increase the expected benefits from voting.  However, it is unlikely that compensation for voting would exceed or even meet the costs of missing work and becoming informed on the issues and candidates.  A study conducted in Lancaster, CA revealed that with a $25 incentive payment, the turnout rate could be increased to 19.2% from an uncompensated turnout rate of 14.9%.  This increase is not huge and indicates that monetary incentives will not be a sufficient means of raising citizen’s expected benefits above the costs.  

While LA’s payment proposal focuses on increasing the benefits of voting, other options that decrease the costs of voting could be more effective.  Such options include automatic registration of eligible voters, being able to vote by phone, or being able to vote on multiple days.  A policy that simultaneously increases the expected benefits of voting and decreases the costs stands a better chance of spurring higher voter turnout. 

Can Property Rights Protect Nature?

In this article, John Stossel claims assigning property rights to nature will do more to protect the environment than allowing the government to protect it. He claims that when people own things and there is a simple, honest court system, the environment would be less subject to depletion. This is similar to the Coasian solution to externalities (people would act to keep their property from being harmed, while also protecting society's interests), suggesting private property rights can limit negative effects upon society, although Coase would go further in suggesting that court systems would not even be needed. Stossel does not only claim a Coasian-like solution would work; he also claims that private property rights can actually protect the environment more than government can. When the government attempts to protect the environment by making it public, you have what Stossel calls 'tragedy of the commons," which is when people treat/value public property worse than they would treat/value there own. However, I do not think Stossel takes into account the assignment problem very well.

Rational Ignorance: Exposing a flaw in Tiebout's Set of Assumptions

After reading both Tiebout and Johnson, I discovered a contradiction in the foundations of their arguments. One of the first assumptions that Tiebout mentions in his paper is that citizens have perfect knowledge of the revenue-expenditure patterns of all polities. If we combine this with his other assumptions, we follow Tiebout as he contends that a person will take her knowledge of the spending patterns of each polity and simply move to the one that gives her the most utility. Thus, for Tiebout, it is rational for a person to be informed about the revenue-expenditure patterns of her community and the other communities around her, because she stands to gain from moving to the community that has a spending pattern that she likes best. Although Johnson builds his argument toward a conclusion unrelated to Tiebout's, he also touches on the question of political knowledge, and gives an opposite answer. To Johnson, it is not rational for a citizen to be knowledgeable of political issues, which certainly include (but are not limited to) community revenue-expenditure patterns. To Johnson, this rational ignorance stems from the fact that each community member has a less-than-miniscule chance of affecting revenue-expenditure patterns and other political issues her community must decide on. So which is it: is it rational for a citizen to be uninformed about her community’s political issues, specifically revenue-expenditure patterns, or not?

This article (see 5th and 6th paragraphs) that summarizes polls of California voters suggests that very few of them know much about the revenue-expenditure patterns of their state. When pollsters gave voters a list of California's four largest spending categories and asked them to identify which one was the largest of the four, only 22% were able to choose the right answer (public schools). Responders were clearly ignorant, at least with respect to this question, considering they would have performed better if they had randomly guessed. A different question on the poll revealed that only 9% of Californian voters surveyed knew both the largest source of revenue and the largest spending category of their state.** If Tiebout is right, then why do so few people know about the revenue and expenditures of their state? It could be because only a small minority of those polled choose to act rationally and learn their state's spending patterns. This explanation isn't all that satisfying, though, because it suggests that our society is one full of irrational people and that the homoeconomicus is a rare breed. Assuming that most people of a community do in fact act rationally, the only other explanation is that Tiebout's assumptions are too bold and do not capture reality. My prediction is that people don’t take the time to learn about the revenue-expenditure patterns of their communities not only because they have a miniscule chance of affecting them (as Johnson suggests) but also because they are much less mobile than Tiebout is willing to acknowledge and often do fall victim to job constraints and other causes of imperfect mobility. If it is the case that people cannot easily move into communities that employ preferable revenue-expenditure patterns, then it is irrational for people to waste time researching those patterns, and thus Johnson’s idea of rational ignorance reigns supreme over Tiebout’s ideas of incentivized learning and acting.   

**I am aware that the poll results demonstrate how much citizens know about their state, a much larger political entity than those that Tiebout shaped his argument around. I'm assuming that city-centered polls wouldn't vary drastically from this Californian one, but if they do, then I owe Tiebout more credit than I am giving him. 

Don't Cry For Me, Hong Kong

The "rational abstention" argument in David Johnson's piece on voter ignorance presents democracy-lovers with a cynical challenge: do citizens really have any stake in elections? According to Johnson's theory, voters in large democracies have very little reason to actually exercise their franchise—that is, they are rational in declining to vote. Johnson reaches this conclusion by focusing on the instrumental  value of an individual's vote. Since the probability that any single vote will decide an election is vanishingly small, even those voters who place a premium on one outcome over the other (that is, voters who value Candidate A over Candidate B to the tune of a couple thousand—or even million—dollars) can expect a laughably small expected payoff. In the face of such nihilistic odds, the real surprise is why anyone votes at all.

But the real world furnishes us with examples of ordinary citizens going to great lengths—and great personal cost—to secure their vote. Recently, Hong Kong has been wracked by protests over the slow pace of democratization in this British-colony-turned-Chinese-Special-Autonomous-Zone. The culmination of months of unease over the increasingly authoritarian control exerted by Beijing, this weekend's protests featured the use of tear gas and pepper spray, and still the protestors turned out in the tens of thousands to demand their right to democratic elections. How does such passion develop in the apathetic atmosphere predicted by Johnson's rational abstention argument? In a fully democratic Hong Kong, these protestors' votes would have low instrumental value—surely not worth the costs associated with protesting against heavily-armed and aggressive police.

Two hypothesis could explain why those in Hong Kong do, in fact, care about their franchise. The Expressive Voter hypothesis, considered by Johnson, posits that people vote to express something about themselves: civic-mindedness, for example. Going to the polls and voting for a candidate or referendum outcome gives intrinsic utility. The expressive appeal of voting may help to explain why the citizens of Hong Kong have gone to such lengths to demand free elections. A second hypothesis I would put forward is one we will likely come across later in Caplan's The Myth of the Rational Voter. In his book, Caplan argues that the so-called Self-Interested Voter Hypothesis (SIVH) is inaccurate. That is, he contends that people don't vote by considering possible pay-offs to themselves, but rather vote according to their vision of what the best society would be. Although disregarding the SIVH doesn't eliminate the cost-benefit analysis entirely, it certainly helps to divorce voting from its instrumental value to the individual voter. Under this model, the citizens of Hong Kong value their franchise because it is an integral part of their vision of the best society (a democratic one), and not because of specific benefits they expect to receive through it.

Whatever the explanation, the implication is clear: people care about their vote, regardless of the strong (and rational) forces urging apathy. This concern is on display in Hong Kong.