The Iraqi Elections: Proportional Representation

On the eve of Iraqi’s election on January 30, 2005, it would be useful to talk about their electoral process, described briefly in CNN’s overview of the event. The main goal of the elections is to choose a national assembly consisting of approximately 275 members. The assembly’s central purpose is to “debate and approve a new constitution” to overcome the oppression faced under the Saddam’s rule, and to move towards a democratic society. The voting system involves a “single, national ballot, without constituencies,” where voters are expected to vote for a party (and the party’s list of candidates) or a group of parties. The seats are distributed through list proportional representation, in which the amount of seats a party obtains is proportional to that party’s overall share of the national vote. So, in other words, the more a party garners votes, the more power and seats that party will attain in the national assembly. For example, if a party gets 40% of the national vote, then that party would get 40% of the seats in the assembly, or 110 of the possible 275 seats. The party would then assign the 110 seats to its top 110 candidates from its list (which is ordered). Proportional representation has its share of advantages and disadvantages. First, it would give smaller parties and independents a chance to take part in the construction of Iraq’s constitution, meaning that every group has a voice, which is what democracy is all about. Second, it uses ordering information when making a list of party candidates, even though the voter casts his ballot for a party, not a candidate. Third, voter turnout would be exceptionally high, since many voters may vote to get a certain candidate elected. Since there are thousands of candidates listed, there is a greater chance of one of them having some kind of connection with voters (i.e. they may be friends or have come from the same region). Fourth, because there are so many parties and so many candidates, it would be nearly impossible to acquire information on all of them, so rationally ignorant voting would occur. Fifth, strategic behavior would not be minimized. For example, a party could list a candidate that is very popular amongst Iraqis to acquire more votes, thus gaining more seats in the assembly. Sixth, the outcome is not Condorcet efficient, since no true winner is determined. Finally, there is a greater possibility for an extremist group to be voted into the assembly, which may disrupt national unity. http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/11/21/iraq.election.reut/index.html

Basics of Interest Group Influence/Behavior and van Winden's Conclusions

In class recently we talked discussed Becker’s piece Public Policies, Pressure Groups and Dead Weight Costs. This piece mainly discussed the political budget constraint (the interaction between taxes and subsidies), the relationship between size and effectiveness of pressure groups, deadweight costs of taxes, and incentives of interest groups (to try to bar entry from their subsidies as much as possible). In class we touched a little bit on the ways in which groups exert pressure but not much. This is the focus of the piece I read by Frans van Winden called Interest Group Behavior and Influence. I liked it because laid out plainly the ways in which interest groups may attempt to influence public policy. Van Winden broke influence down into two main categories. The first manner of influence he simply calls “influence functions” and they refer to the “direct” influencing of policy makers to affect policy. Van Winden describes this first interaction as an “all-pay” auction, where a policy maker lays out a set of possible policies and the interest groups represent the “demand” for the possible options. Van Winden makes the important note here that much literature concludes that “resources spent by these interest groups entail a pure social cost”, because “their activity has no productive aspect”. Van Winden also notes, as we have learned in class, that Becker said such inefficiencies are taken into account when making the decision (a more positive outlook). At this point Van Winden makes a very interesting point, first noting Becker’s conclusion that all interest groups and society would be better off with reduced expenditures on policy influence, and then posing the contradiction “since the influence of expenditures (pressure) is assumed but not explained, it is not clear why policymakers would behave this way”. So he is questioning the incentives behind “public” policymakers as to why they allow such activity. Maybe to explain this we have to take into account the policymaker’s utility function and assume that such a person would have a degree of “selfishness”. Maybe they do take it into account and allowing such competition nets the largest gains to society. I would be inclined to think a policymaker has selfish incentives in interest group competition and can justify the competition by saying it yields the best results for society (when in fact it may not). The second manner of influence he calls “vote functions” and this refers to the indirect affecting of policy by influencing the behavior of voters. He notes two types of models exchange models, in which a campaign contribution is designed to obtain a beneficial policy, and support models, in which the groups may associate contributions positively with electoral success. He notes some important conclusions here: 1) That groups will contribute to favored candidates only, 2) That the more beneficial the policy (to the group) the higher the contribution will be (this follows with marginal costs = marginal benefits), 3) no contributions will be made by a group if the candidates have identical platforms and 4) contributions will be higher the sooner the election. Here, van Winden got a little over my head but an important conclusion of his was that “existing models typically assume a level of rationality which seems unrealistic”. He also believes that “the impact of emotions and feelings” is neglected as well. He essentially states that people are more "myopic" and focused on the present than we assume and finally that the subject of emotions may explain quite simply that interest groups may rally around a policymaker or that policymakers may care about a certain group enough that he/or she does not need compensations to act.

Formation of the Iraqi Bureaucracy

I came across an article dealing with top-level Iraqi bureaucrats meeting with some of their U.S. counterparts. It is interesting to think about how the Iraqi institutions will develop if and when stability is reached in the conflicted nation. For so long, these men and women have had to deal with “changing whims of the ruler had the force of law.” Now they will have the chance to deal with freedom and open market conditions. One trade ministry head said it best—“For example, dealing in foreign currency: One day it's a crime where they cut your hand or your ear for it, and the next day it was perfectly legal.” Such dramatic change is an obstacle that will face the developing nation. We have been talking about the autonomy of the bureaucracy and the relationships between the voters-->regulators-->bureaucrats. Iraq is in the unique position to use its valuable resources of oil and labor to grow into a prosperous nation. The many factions within the Iraqi society and the influx of terrorist activity are the only things standing in the way of such prosperity. The voters will have some distrust in the government due to the polarizing religious views. The regulators will have the same problem. The bureaucrats, on the other hand, will be run relatively in the dark to the Iraqi public. The American public and politicians do not know much about the doings of our own bureaus, so how will a nation with few sources of information be able to know what their officials are doing? The hope is that the Iraqi bureaucrats realize the potential for Iraqi growth by not becoming corrupt and capitalizing on this opportunity of freedom. If this becomes a problem, the Iraqi government will need to implement the oversight committees and an incentive system that has made the U.S. system effective.

Gay Marriage Amendments and Voting Models

Throughout this fall’s election season, I’ve found the role of gay marriage in the election extremely interesting. On Election Day, 11 states, including key swing states like Ohio, Michigan, and Oregon, voted on state constitutional amendments to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman. All eleven amendments passed, most with fairly large margins. Most of the media attention to this issue has been devoted to how these ballot questions increased turnout of conservative voters and, as such, may have led to President Bush’s victory (http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,137319,00.html, http://www.keepmedia.com/ShowItemDetails.do?ema_id=84095&item_id=640397&oliID=176), but what is also interesting for the purposes of public choice is why this particular issue is one that rallies so many voters and arguably greatly increases voter turnout.

While there has been some discussion about just how high voter turnout was, it is generally accepted by analysts and pundits that it was noticeably higher than most previous elections, which means that something about this year’s voting menu made people go out and vote. In a variety of polls, voters have stated that morality and values were major influences on their voting decisions this year, and some have even stated explicitly that they went to the polls to vote on the issue of gay marriage. In thinking about the decisions that these voters made, I found two topics from class discussion applicable and interesting to consider – cost-benefit analysis and minimax regret.

In terms of costs and benefits, it appears that more voters’ personal cost-benefit analyses than in previous years led them to the conclusion that the benefits of voting in this election outweighed the costs. It hasn’t really gotten easier to actually vote since the last election, so the change is most likely to have occurred on the benefit side of the analysis. Due to the admitted role that morals and opposition to gay marriage played in voters’ decisions to vote, it’s pretty easy to look at gay marriage amendments as a major influence on the benefit side of the analysis and therefore a motivator for voter turnout. Voters appear to value the perceived morality of government policies and losing this morality would be extremely detrimental to their utility. It seems that many voters consider gay marriage to undermine their moral positions, so preventing it from occurring would provide them with a tremendous benefit, a benefit that appears to have, for many, outweighed the costs of voting.

As far as minimax regret voting decisions, this issue may have been of such great importance to many voters, most likely because of its perceived moral implications, that they were determined to vote on the matter no matter what the likelihood that they would influence the outcome. In this model, being the one who didn’t vote and then seeing the measure fail would have caused these voters such great regret that they were motivated to vote. In most cases, this would seem like a slightly less reasonable assessment, but due to the importance of morals in this election, it seems more reasonable to apply minimax regret these voting decisions.

Finally, returning to the issue that has received so much media attention – is it problematic that political strategists seem to have added a new tactic to their campaigns and elections repertoire? In the past, the race to the middle and the median voter theory seem to have dominated the strategies of major candidates, but could this new use of provocative ballot questions move us toward a strategy of rigging ballot questions to attract extremists whose voter participation is motivated entirely by one issue?

Voter Preferences?

I read a recent article on cnn.com that talked about voter preferences for people at the polls this fall. The article can be found here, by clicking the link. The article talked about the fact that when faced with important issues in voting this year, voters were more likely to vote for their "moral values" if it was listed and more likely to vote for other issues if that topic was not listed. Depending on who came up with the ballots and format, voters were indirectly swayed to vote for specific issues based on its listing. "When "moral values" was included in poll questions, it was named more often than any other issue. But when voters were just asked to name the issue most important in their vote for president -- without being given a list of answers -- moral values trailed the war in Iraq and the economy, according to the Pew survey." In other words, when given a list for voters to view, most voted for "moral values" as a top priority rather than the other choices given. But when lists were not given and voters were just asked what their top priorities were, they stated other issues, such as the War on Terror and the economy. While the Bush campaign drove voter preferences by including moral values as one of its issues, it was not the campaign's main focal point. "Moral values was an element in the Bush formula, but probably not the driving one," said Lee Miringoff, president of the National Council of Public Polls." I found this article interesting and having to do with public choice because voter preferences were not necessarily reflected in the way people ranked their top priority issues in the polls. Rather, voters ranked their issues depending on the format of the statement: listing the issues or asking an open-ended question. This also could bring up the question of who came up with the format for the voters to answer these questions and which side of the fence were they on? Did they not give a list of choices knowing the voters would state the War and the economy as their top choice? Or, did they give a list knowing that moral values would be selected? These are just a few questions to consider. It becomes quite evident that voting format has a lot to do with the way people vote and are swayed to vote for specific issues. article address: http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/11/12/voters.moralvalues.ap/index.html

Toy Recalls and Public Choice

"Every industry or occupation that has enough political power to utilize the state will seek to control entry." -George j. Stigler, Theory of Regulation CNN.com recently reported that the Consumer Product Safety Commission has released its top ten toy recalls, coinciding with the annual holiday gift-buying spree. The list affects such toy giants as Hasbro (Nerf) and Mattel. Even Allen Iverson's toddler shoes produced by Reebok are being recalled for chocking hazards (ironically, Iverson is not the Answer for your infant's shoe needs). How would Stigler understand such bureaucratic action? At first glance, such safety regulation would seem incompatible with Stigler's analysis. After all, he writes, "Regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit." Why would the toy industry want their toys recalled? How can we understand recalls through the public choice microscope? The answer lies in barrier entries and marketing. First, by creating such high standards for production, established toy producers raise the fixed costs of producing toys, therefore increasing the costs it takes to break into the toy market. Established firms already understand the correct ways to produce safe toys, having dealt with the regulations since they were first constructed. In this light, it is odd to see toy giant Mattel on the recall list, but let's remember that Mattel produces hundreds of toys a year; one recall has to be expected. Not all toy lines will meet standards, especially when a "rigid plastic" is considered unsafe. In summation, high safety standards deter potential toy producers, erecting an entry barrier. Secondly, high standards produce marketing ability. Those firms who are publicly recalled get bad press, which implicitly implies good press for those firms not recalled. Negative effects on a firm are not sought through regulation, but firms may seek regulation to produce negative effects on competitors or possible competitors. Another way to view this regulation is from the opposite side, not from the firm's lense but from the bureau's. By publicly announcing recalls, the Consumer Product Safety Commission proves to their funder (Congress) that they are producing their output (safety) and therefore deserve their budget. Somewhere, Weingast and Moran are smiling. -Brett Jerasa

Intelligence Overhaul

Recently, there have been a few articles concerning how GOP memebers of the house blocked a vote on the intelligence bill that detailed the recommendations from the 9/11 commission. Here is an article from CNN and one from the NY Times about the issue. The topic relates pretty closely to our discussions in class about whether agencies are autonomous or not. One noteworthy point was a quote from Speaker of the House, Dennis Hastert: "When it comes to a question of the safety of our troops, I don't think we should have any question at all. For our members to move a piece of legislation, they have to have confidence that we do no harm, that we actually make sure that our troops are safe." His statement was about how parts of the legislation were not defined well enough. The apparent desire to have an in-depth understanding of the workings of the bill seems to be one example that supports the Congressional Dominance approach. Although Congress does not seem to have an in-depth knowledge of the issues in general, when they are not pleased with the end results, they do get more involved to regulate agencies. Likewise, the possibility of creating a director to oversee all the intelligence agencies fits into a similar scheme, where Congress maintains the ability to control agencies, but only acts to enforce regulations when they need to. In this case, Hastert's opinion actually protected the status quo for the moment (i.e. not advocating additional regulations yet), however it is clear that overall there has been a shift towards more closely scrutinizing what the intelligence agencies have been doing.

Another interesting quote was from Thomas H. Kean, chairman of the 9/11 commission: "I think there's no question that there are people in the Pentagon who want the status quo, and they fought very hard with their allies in Congress for the status quo." In context, Pentagon officials were acting to protect their power and budget, which follows the model of agent's self-interest we've seen. However, in this case the officials were acting more like an interest group affecting policy decisions instead of agents trying to maximize their budget. Assuming Kean is right about Pentagon employees working to enact a decision, it presents a means for agencies to have a degree of autonomy not really explored in the models. An action like this would be somewhat similar to an entry barrier (at least on the senior bureaucrat level, as a director to oversee all the intelligence agencies has been proposed). Assuming the agencies are actually inefficient, such a behavior is like the rent-seeking activities we have studied.

Overall, the topic is pretty interesting, as it is a current example of agency regulation, with interesting variations from the models we've been studying.