The Iraqi Elections: Proportional Representation

On the eve of Iraqi’s election on January 30, 2005, it would be useful to talk about their electoral process, described briefly in CNN’s overview of the event. The main goal of the elections is to choose a national assembly consisting of approximately 275 members. The assembly’s central purpose is to “debate and approve a new constitution” to overcome the oppression faced under the Saddam’s rule, and to move towards a democratic society. The voting system involves a “single, national ballot, without constituencies,” where voters are expected to vote for a party (and the party’s list of candidates) or a group of parties. The seats are distributed through list proportional representation, in which the amount of seats a party obtains is proportional to that party’s overall share of the national vote. So, in other words, the more a party garners votes, the more power and seats that party will attain in the national assembly. For example, if a party gets 40% of the national vote, then that party would get 40% of the seats in the assembly, or 110 of the possible 275 seats. The party would then assign the 110 seats to its top 110 candidates from its list (which is ordered). Proportional representation has its share of advantages and disadvantages. First, it would give smaller parties and independents a chance to take part in the construction of Iraq’s constitution, meaning that every group has a voice, which is what democracy is all about. Second, it uses ordering information when making a list of party candidates, even though the voter casts his ballot for a party, not a candidate. Third, voter turnout would be exceptionally high, since many voters may vote to get a certain candidate elected. Since there are thousands of candidates listed, there is a greater chance of one of them having some kind of connection with voters (i.e. they may be friends or have come from the same region). Fourth, because there are so many parties and so many candidates, it would be nearly impossible to acquire information on all of them, so rationally ignorant voting would occur. Fifth, strategic behavior would not be minimized. For example, a party could list a candidate that is very popular amongst Iraqis to acquire more votes, thus gaining more seats in the assembly. Sixth, the outcome is not Condorcet efficient, since no true winner is determined. Finally, there is a greater possibility for an extremist group to be voted into the assembly, which may disrupt national unity. http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/11/21/iraq.election.reut/index.html