Shifting Preferences in Congressional Committees

I came across this article at cnn.com. The article describes the Senate's approval of a new intelligence bill. The bill is designed to "overhaul the U.S. intelligence community by placing the budgets and most assets of 15 spy agencies under a new post of national intelligence director". This bill is a direct reflection of the re-alignment of the relavent senate committees, which in this case is the Senate Committee on Intelligence. In the Weingast-Moran article, the authors put forth the idea that legislators set up an incentive system to control bureau behavior. The incentives include the budget which is controlled by the appropriations committee, confirmation of the senior bureaucrat, and oversight. With the approval of this bill by the Senate, the memebers of Congress realize that "Congress now must take steps to reform its own oversight of U.S. intelligence agencies". The passing of this bill can be seen as a realignment of the status quo in both the committee and the Congress as a whole. The committee has opted for higher levels of intelligence, and a more centralized procedure of coordinating intelligence. Their use of the budget and oversight for the new postions created are incentives for the bureaucrats to follow their preferences. This refelcts well the Congressional Dominance view that Wiengast and Moran put forth.