Sunday, September 25, 2011

The Median Voter Theory and Passing Policy

This blog entry claims that partisanship will be the theme of the 2012 election. Both parties are claiming that they will hold strong to their principles rather than compromise with their opponents. Stevenson claims that the ideal election would be “an election in which differences are sharpened rather than blurred, where voters have the opportunity to sort out the mixed messages from the last several cycles.” At this stage in the game, candidates take strong stances on policies so that voters can distinguish between them. In addition, Stevenson points out that, “Americans tend to prefer divided government, on the assumption that it will curb the excesses of either side and force compromise.” These two assertions relate to the Median Voter Theory in the sense that voters choose candidates closest to them on the voter preference distribution, but that the median voter’s preference is the result of a diverse distribution.

Stevenson concludes the article by arguing that governments that promote extreme policy stances will fail to effectively tackle complicated policy issues. This claim extends upon the Median Voter Theory by declaring that temperate positions on policy allow for a well-functioning government. The question that remains after the Median Voter Theory has been applied to Stevenson’s argument is whether or not elected officials can pass policy based on their moderate position on the political preference distribution.

Although Stevenson’s claims relate to the Median Voter Theory, some aspects are contradictory. The Median Voter Theory states, “In two-party systems, each party will try to resemble its opponent as closely as possible.” At this stage in the game, neither campaign is obeying this claim. The polarity of the two campaigns could converge as the election draws near, but as of right now, neither the Democrats nor the Republicans want to resemble their rival.

If Down’s theory holds true, the two parties will converge on the voter preference distribution in order to gain the support of more voters. If Stevenson’s claims are legitimate, the moderate result of voter preferences will lead to compromise between the two parties in order to pass policy.

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