One explanation could be that simple majority benefits the two major parties in control. Many journalists this election have been emphasizing the importance of not voting for a third party candidate, which may make us consider if the current voting system helps keep these arguably less than ideal parties in control.
Another explanation could be the feasibility of the multiple rounds of voting some of these systems require. Primary runoffs had an average reduction of turnout of 35.3% according to one report. Not only this, the reduction was biased with regards to demographics. This is likely not ideal for a more widespread election system.
Lastly, strategic voting may erode much of the benefit of these alternative voting systems. To clarify, strategic voting is "when voters cast an insincere ballot in order to increase their expected value for an election outcome." As seen in the graphic below, the group satisfaction when people vote strategically can decrease significantly when using these alternative systems. Still, the group satisfaction is likely to be higher than when using plurality. Overall, while these explanations at least provide some reasoning for the prevalence of plurality, it may be time to reexamine if alternative systems could perform better in various scenarios.
1 comment:
I have been reflecting on many of the same questions as Ray, in particular analysis of elections that require in person run-offs, akin to the current voting structure in Louisiana. The voter turn out during runoffs often declines, even in the elections that are decisive for the candidate that will hold office, a more extreme example of the primary runoffs that Ray mentions above. This supports the importance of instant run-off models that we have examined, such as the Borda count, the Coombs or the Hare model compared to models that require in-person run-off attendance.
However, I hypothesize that individuals would be even more reluctant to vote in elections that require ranking of candidates than they are to participate in our current election system. Informed votership in a ranking election could require more research than participation in the current model if the individual currently votes for one of the two main parties. This would increase the costs of participating in the election with an increase in time costs beforehand. This is particularly concerning because it could lead to an increase in the level of rational ignorance that Johnson discusses. Furthermore, taking the time to rank all of the candidates would increase time in voting booths, where a minimal increase in time for every person would lead to an increase in overall time involved in the actual process of voting. The rational voter model presented by Johnson already argues that the rational voter doesn’t vote; increasing the cost side of that inequality disincentivizes voting even further. I agree with Ray that our current voting system needs to be reexamined, but I caution a blind leap in favor of other voting models.
Post a Comment