Sunday, October 01, 2017

Rational Voting in Party Planning

I am in an a cappella group on grounds, and we are very democratic. We have to hold a vote in order to do anything, even when deciding to have a party. Last week when we were deciding whether or not to have a party, I went through the process of voting like a rational voter would. It would seem like the rational thing to do would be to vote, because there is little personal time involved with me voting – all I have to do is make my decision and send a quick text to our Social Chair.

However, to Johnson, voting would be irrational in my case. Firstly, as a fourth-year college student, my time costs are extremely high. Taking the time to vote on whether or not to have this party is valuable time that I could be using to do schoolwork, eat or sleep. Although the act of voting takes a second, casting an informed vote requires careful consideration of who’s going to be at the party, how long the party will be, the opportunity costs of going to the party, etc., which takes a decent amount of time. Secondly, the outcome differential was minimal for me. Having the party would not have given me substantially higher utility than not having the party. I had work due the next day, and I wouldn't have been able to do work that night had I attended a party. Lastly, my vote had little probability of affecting the decision. Even though there are only 14 of us, this party was going to be with our good friends from another UVA a cappella group, and I knew that a lot of our guys would vote to have this party because of that. Ultimately, my expected marginal benefit did not exceed my marginal cost of voting, and so I didn’t vote.


As I expected, we ended up having the party, but I attended and actually had a great time. Music from Earth Wind & Fire rang through the night, as it was the 21st of September. Although my actual benefit from attending the party was greater than my expected benefit of doing so, I'm not surprised at my abstention from voting given my understanding of the rational voting theory. 


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