After living in a house with 17 guys your standards of cleanliness plummet. One starts to see forks as “clean enough,” and never wears just socks, or God forbid go barefoot, inside the house. So an opportunity for collective action presents itself; equally divide up the work and whip out the Swiffers. But, there is a reason the house is never clean. Similar to Mueller 2.1 both public goods and a prisoner’s dilemma matrix are at play. A clean house is a public good, it’s nonexcludable to any resident and non-rivalrous because my enjoyment (utility) of the clean sink does not diminish my housemate’ enjoyment. Therefore when we decide on a time to clean the house an individual can either contribute or flake. For simplicity's sake consider only 2 residents (JB and I) in the following game even though this is happening with 17 people:
The Nash Equilibrium is both players flaking thus identifying a reluctance to contribute to the cost of goods that bestow group benefits. In other words, the thought of a freerider is far more disgusting than black mold in the shower. However, this equilibrium is not Pareto efficient because if we both contribute then we have higher payoffs. Yet, at the end of the day it's just easier to walk around the house in your sneakers than to make everyone accountable.
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