A hot topic in the news these days is whether the cap and trade approach should be incorporated into the United States budget. Cap and trade works to first set a limit on the amount of pollution emissions (the “cap”) and then to open up a market for different firms to sell and buy pollution permits from each other (the “trade”.) The idea behind this approach is that it is efficient in how it minimizes pollution while internalizing the externality, so that government intervention is kept to a minimum.
The problem with this approach, according to a recent New York Times article, is that it works like a tax, in that it limits firms from producing where they want to produce so they charge a higher price and consumers must pay more, and that it redistributes rights to large firms. The simple idea of cap and trade had twisted into a complex system of exemptions in which “those with the most muscle got the best deals,” coining it the new name “tax-and-redistribution.” Instead of auctioning off these pollutions rights, the government was simply giving away rights to big companies.
Senators Maria Cantwell and Susan Collins worked up a new alternative they called “cap and dividend,” in which permits are auctioned off to firms and then rebates are returned to consumers to make up for the higher costs. The success of this bill passing however, will depend on the elasticity of the senators’ support, which is ironically swayed by large firm lobbying.
2 comments:
Nice! 3:33 PM!
“Cap and dividend” seems to be a fairer and socially more optimal policy. However, if we consider the obstacle posed by both the principal agent problem and shirking, what is socially optimal might never happen.
Olsen argued that interest groups de facto, take over the government ergo leading to a decline of the nation. Becker however, dampens Olsen’s worries and argues that the opposition will always be able to reverse sub-optimal policies. Furthermore, these sub-optimal policies can’t survive because different groups have equal political strength in a democracy, and because policies that are favoring a certain group are necessarily hurting another.
In this example, the problem with Becker’s claim is that the non-passing of cap and dividend only hurts the constituents but not the decision makers (representatives). And because of the clear evidence that shirking is a common practice, and also because the different groups of representatives all have the same preference (pleasing the interest groups in order for them to raise money for their campaigns)and thus the opposition is non existent, it can be clearly seen that Olsen is right about his conclusion that interest groups are subverting the role the representatives are supposed to play: represent the interests of their constituents. Sub-optimal policies are passed when in the aggregate, we could move to a point (policy) where society as a whole is better off. And thus there is a decline of the nation (in aggregate terms).
Post a Comment