This article, recently published in The Economist, discusses factional splits in existing political parties. The author claims that it is nearly impossible to build a new party from the ground up in the U.S. as voters, despite their ideological preferences, will only vote for one of the two main parties for fear of wasting their votes. When a new party forms due to a factional split in an existing party, however, this wasted-vote risk is diminished, as the new party already has power in Congress. As long as the splinter party has a coherent ideology and a large enough voter base, then, it stands a chance at winning subsequent elections. The author of the article believes that tea-party Republicans have what it takes to eventually form a competitive third party in the U.S., with a coherent agenda and a strong voter base that is likely to follow them.
This article is clearly directly relevant to Downs’ Median Voter Theorem. If part of the Republican party stands a chance at breaking off and forming its own party, this suggests that a significant contingent of voters must feel alienated by the current system. This implies an asymmetric distribution of voters, with a sizable number of voters concentrated towards one extreme of the distribution. This asymmetric voter distribution is currently not an issue for the tea party, as theirs is the dominant Republican agenda. As more conservative Republican voters near the median begin to feel alienated and begin to abstain from voting, however, Republican ideology may begin to shift back towards the center and tea party members will then feel alienated. In either case, a significant contingent of the Republican party is alienated, meaning there is good reason to think a split in the party could be successful. Voters that feel alienated are likely to abstain, meaning that more moderate Republicans are less likely to vote where tea party ideology dominates and vice versa. In order to be able to satisfy both contingents, it is possible that the Republican party may need to split into two, thereby leading to a significant change in the American political landscape.
1 comment:
While reading this post, the phrase, "voters, despite their ideological preferences, will only vote for one of the two main parties for fear of wasting their votes" caught my eye. This author implicitly assumes that voters believe their votes do in fact directly influence the outcome of the election, flying in the face of Johnson's theory that voters know their vote won't count and likely vote due to social pressure. However, I believe it is important to look more closely at the concept of a protest vote for a fringe party. Using the Downs article and its extensions we worked through in class, we see how a protest vote can move the median voter and help shape the debate. I think it is possible that protest voters have a different cost/benefit/utility equation than those voters who simply vote because of social pressure for mainstream parties. In our initial equation, the voters vote to change the outcome of the election in question. We saw this is irrational and unlikely. A protest vote is cast generally A.) knowing their candidate won't win, B.) knowing they're likely hurting the candidate they would have voted for, and C.) and most importantly, in the hopes of indirectly shaping the debate in the next election and moving the median voter. Isn't it possible that these are simply too different to compare using the same theories? While protest votes are often seen as a waste and perhaps the most irrational part of a generally irrational system, isn't it possible that they are in fact the most rational expression of a voters preferences because they can change the median voter.
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