Sunday, November 05, 2017

Opioid Epidemic and Rent-seeking

You’ve probably heard of the opioid epidemic. If not, a quick summary: in the past 10 years or so, there has been a dramatic increase in the use of both prescription and non-prescription opioid drugs, which are painkillers such as Oxycontin and heroin. These drugs are extremely addicting and can ruin lives. In 2016, drug overdoses killed more Americans than the wars in Vietnam and Iraq combined.  Public health officials are trying to figure out how regular U.S. citizens are accessing these prescription drugs from pill distributors, but according to this video from the Daily Show, maybe they need to start talking to economists and legislators.


I realize that late night talk shows are not the best source of news, but if you skip to the 1:00 min mark in the video, Trevor starts talking about the rent-seeking activities of the pharmaceutical industry. Drug makers spend more than any other industry to lobby for certain legislation from Congress. In this case, the rent that the industry received was greater legal restrictions on the actions that the DEA could take to stop them from selling opioid pills. This is a form of protection of the pharmaceutical industry that allowed them to sell more pills and make positive economic profits. Not only was the $246 million in actual lobbying a waste of resources that could’ve been used for other productive activities, but the outcome of the lobbying, the new law, seems to have done way more harm than good to the public as the opioid epidemic gets worse everyday. 

1 comment:

Madalyn Pemberton said...

While from Stigler’s model it can appear as though this capturing of government regulation is a done deal, Peltzman’s contributions to Capture Theory and Olson’s insights on interest groups provide a source for careful optimism:

Simply put, the key difference between Stigler and Peltzman is that Peltzman accounts for the probability of opposition by a taxed member [denoted by (N-n)h] and the effect this will have on the ability of the representative to maximize the majority. The goal of the representative under Capture Theory is to maximize the majority (because they are vote maximizers) by increasing the probability of support by beneficiaries to support them while simultaneously decreasing the probability of opposition from taxed members.

Combining this probability of opposition with Olson’s discussion of interest groups, one can begin to envision how a policy change in favor of protecting the health and safety of Americans rather than putting more money in big pharma’s pockets might come about. Those impacted by the opioid epidemic have greatly increased in number, thus they can be viewed as a latent group. If they are able to be mobilized, perhaps by providing some sort of non-collective benefit (monetary compensation to pay for rehabilitation, for example), then the free-rider problem can be overcome, thus hopefully leading to (N-n)h being sufficiently large enough to sway policy in favor of consumers.