While a typical rent-seeking example might apply to a corporation contributing to a politician's campaign to pass some given piece of legislation, this is just a first-order rent-seeking example. US Senators have more to offer rent-seekers than just legislation: they have power over Supreme Court nominations, nominations that can long outlast any given senator. Due to the life-long appointments of Supreme Court Justices, the expected value to a corporation of a given Justice is much higher than that of a member of the US House of Representatives. However, due to the inability to directly contribute to nominees to secure their appointment, senators act as intermediaries in this process.
By donating to senator's campaigns, corporations (through interest groups) are spending large amounts of money to get some benefit from the Justice's confirmation. Since this is just a transfer of wealth from the status quo to some alternative legislative ruling, it is a clear example of rent-seeking. Despite the fact that the nominated Justice is not involved in the transfer, this also represents a case of an externality as a result of the transfer, since the nominee's odds of confirmation go up as a result of the donations. This combination of the two can help to shed some light on the Supreme Court's decision in Citizen's United v. FEC (2010), as it allows for future nominees to benefit from the externality that results from corporate rent-seeking with senators.
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