Thursday, September 02, 2021

Ideology & the Hold Out Problem in the Senate

     As October approaches, the Biden administration is pushing hard for the president’s long-awaited infrastructure bill. With the narrowest possible majority in the Senate, Democrats can only pass the high-spending measure using the budget reconciliation process - a loophole allowed once per year to circumvent the filibuster. Still, in order to take advantage of this opportunity, every single democratic senator and Vice President Harris will have to vote in favor of the bill. As time to whip the votes necessary to pass the infrastructure bill wanes, centrist Democrats like Sen. Joe Manchin of West Virginia can take advantage of the holdout problem described in Grueber chapter 5. 

    Rather than property rights, these 50 democratic senators all share voting rights. As the “last one” to exercise his right to vote - since Manchin’s conservative tendencies mean his vote along the party line is not guaranteed - Manchin is in a position to hold the other Democrats hostage, negotiating bill provisions that uniquely benefit his political interests and/or his constituency. Earlier today, in fact, he decided to capitalize on this position by publicly declaring that the party needed to take a “strategic pause” on the bill the administration is so eager to pass. Majority Leader Schumer will give Manchin much more in negotiations to secure his vote now that he is essentially the only thing blocking this important political victory. 

    This example of the holdout problem is slightly different from those that plague Coasian negotiations. For one thing, though Manchin’s strategy may crumple the collective action of the Senate Democrats, it will not have any negative effect on Senate Republicans, who uniformly oppose the bill. This intragroup effect of the holdout problem is different than intergroup scenarios we studied, where an opposing group’s actions were blocked by the original group’s failure to act collectively. Additionally, unlike a more classical example of the holdout problem, Manchin is one of the only Senate Democrats willing to use the holdout strategy. The political consequences of not supporting such an important party vote could cost more liberal Democrats reelection, meaning there is not much competition to be “the last one.” 

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