The European Union prides itself on being a pinnacle of liberal democracy and has applauded its own skills in influencing the growth of democracy in other European states as well. In the early 2000s, there was a push to expand European Union membership Eastward. Hungary and Poland, historically the largest recipients of EU aid, quickly became poster children for the democratization and integration of post-soviet countries into EU, but began the process of de-democratization only a few years after joining the Union. Since then, unanimity voting rules in the European Union – which carry major consequences for economic, social, and political functions of member states – have put the stability of the Union in danger. This was most clearly demonstrated when Hungary and Poland blocked funding for the 1.8 trillion EUR coronoavirus recovery package in 2020 as a reaction to an attempt to make EU funding conditional on democratic aptitude as measured by the Rule of Law reports (which Hungary and Poland were failing). Perceiving a threat to a major source of their funding, Poland and Hungary blocked the recovery bill until the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation (described above) was removed.
While, as Buchanan and Tullock write in Calculus of Consent, unanimity voting rules can be used to make certain that one's own human and property interests are protected – especially when such interests are as important as those under EU purview – such rules can also pose a major threat to actors when the alternative is forced inaction. In this case, EU citizens in need were initially denied the help that they so direly required by members that, altogether, contributed less to the Union in terms of funding and failed to share the Union's democratic ideals. The lesson is perhaps this: Group membership should be selective and members reasonably homogenous where unanimous voting is in use if an effective decision-making process with external validity is to be established*. This is because in groups with heterogenous interests, members will be tempted and might succeed in leveraging regrettable solutions in exchange for their approval on highly important ones.
* Especially where excludable (membership-only) goods are concerned.
1 comment:
This is a fantastic blog Christianna. One interesting point that I think deserves a closer look within your example is the European Union itself. Formed in 1993, the EU has been a strong alliance that has aligned and helped European countries both economically and politically. But unlike many of the European countries who have populations of millions of individuals who vote in a democratic process for their leaders, the European Union is made up of representatives from each country. In addition, one can assume that countries will ultimately support policies that promote the self-interest of their citizenry. With a group of countries, who to a degree rely on cooperation, it makes sense that having unanimity in voting would make it difficult to pass legislation. As you point out, this can be beneficial when dealing with issues such as human rights where its important that we have some degree of unanimity. When it comes to smaller issues, maybe the European Union should take some advice from Tiebout and instead of requiring unanimity for a relief bill for Covid that need unanimity to be ratified, maybe funds could be allocated to each country who have a better idea on how to distribute those funds to their constituents. Although that begs the question, how should they vote on allocating funds as a union of countries?
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