Low Voter Turnout Results in Platform Stagnation

We have discussed Johnson’s paper “Voting, Rational Abstention, and Rational Ignorance” in class which argues that it is rational for people to abstain from voting because an individual’s single vote has little probability of affecting the outcome of any election. Johnson also pointed out that a large portion of the American population do not vote. This New Yorker article describes non-voters as typically younger, less educated, and of lower income brackets which aligns with Johnson’s descriptions. The New Yorker article furthers that non-voters have “roughly the same view of the Democrats.”

If non-voters decided to vote, electoral races would be swept by the Democrats. The public’s assumption that America is more or less evenly split between Democrat and Republican values is an incorrect reflection of reality. Johnson clarifies this as a problem when he notes that non-voters’ preferences are not reflected in the outcome which “is difficult to interpret as consent of the governed.”

The incorrect belief that the public is evenly split between Democratic and Republican values is one of the most dangerous implications of rational abstention. If every American voted, more Democrats would be elected than Republicans due to the non-voters’ liberal preferences. That in turn would cause the Republican Party and its candidates to change their platform so that they could win elections because, as Downs pointed out, candidates change their platform to win elections. Altering party platforms is part of the natural evolution of politics. However, if the non-voter trend increases, we risk platform stagnation. As voter turnout decreases, our candidates and parties increasingly do not represent contemporary American values.

Shifting Voter Distribution Leads to Shifting Politicians

As the center of the voting population disappears and voters become more polarized, the probability distribution shape of voters has changed to reflect that. Assuming the Downs model of the Median Voter Theorem holds, even a strongly polarized bimodal distribution has a median voter. The Theorem focuses on one central idea: candidates formulate policies (and campaigns) in order to win elections rather than win elections so that they can formulate the policies. The candidates position themselves to appeal to a certain demographic of voters, with the median voter in mind, and plan a strategy in order to capture those voters to win the election.

Donald Trump is one such example. He trademarked "Make America Great Again" a mere 6 days after Obama won reelection in 2012 leading one to assume that Trump has been planning this campaign for at least the last four years. He has studied the changing electorate and positioned himself in a place he believes is optimal to win the median voter. His slogan, "Make America Great Again" was taken from Ronald Reagan's campaign and revived for this 2016 campaign. Reagan's presidency is considered the Republican heyday by many conservatives, which may be the reason Trump chose that particular phrase.

The problem Trump may face in the election, however, is that the Downs assumptions are not the way real life works, and voters can chose to abstain. Trump is likely to alienate voters and lose a good portion those that stay home or those that vote for a third party candidate.

Coase v. Pigou: A False Dichotomy?

The typical introduction to Coase seems to be framed as an alternative to a Pigouvian tax. This seems a bit unfounded to me.

The Coase theorem may work well as an alternative to legal/court action (in a small and local sense), but in the case of its opposition to a more generalized Pigouvian tax, its primacy is less clear. Take, for example, a standard Pigouvian tax: the carbon tax. A condition for an effective Coasian solution is property rights. But how do you assign property rights in the case of global atmospheric pollution? There is also a condition that costs are generally known* by the affected parties. But with the sweeping and invisible effects of global warming, how is the damaged party supposed to both be aware and able to determine the costs to themselves? Are they aware of the difference in their medical bills, food costs, insurance premiums?** In addition, there is difficulty in achieving the cooperation of affected parties. Though most global warming is a result of rich countries’ actions, the ramifications are most felt by people in poorer nations or poorer areas of polluting nations. Though these affected may be willing to pay in negotiations, they are far from able. Furthermore, the real victims are the one who will inherit a damaged earth; do we expect the unborn to mobilize in their opposition?

It seems unlikely that Coase himself would universally oppose a carbon tax (or he'd at least acknowledge the subtleties of each argument). We acknowledge that a Coasian solution works best when the parties involved are small, yet a Pigouvian tax is almost never implemented on just a handful of local actors. A Pigouvian tax is generally seen in a larger national context. It may even be that when Coase’s conditions are least likely, that a Pigouvian tax is a type of Coasian solution. In class we certainly acknowledged this, but I wanted to explicitly state it.

*Though with Coase individuals to not have to precisely calculate the costs (like they do with Pigou), they do need to be aware of the difference between a “bad” and “good” deal.

**There are also monetary benefits of climate change on the general public, such as cheaper energy. No matter who is doing the calculation, it’s a difficult process. However, the general point is that in this case the government may do a better job in measuring costs than the private individual. This is further complicated by the global nature of global warming.

Roommates, Chores, and Making the Pareto-Optimal Move

How do we deal with a roommate who won't do her chores? This can be a big issue. After all, a clean apartment is a public good that everyone* can enjoy. Although our dominant strategy would be to not clean to avoid the costs of spent time, everyone would be better off if we all did our weekly chores.

My apartment has been experiencing this issue recently, and I instantly recognized it as a classic prisoner's dilemma situation. My immediate thought was: "If we want A to do her chores, we should all stop doing ours until she does her fair share. Then, she'll know that if she does her chores, we'll do ours too!"

The Internet had some advice as well. This article suggested that we develop a mini market economy and use chores to gain "points". Certain chores would earn more points than others. This means that when one person is not able to do a certain chore that week, they can pay another person “points” to have them do the chores instead. Of course, as a result of market transactions, everyone is better off! However, we cannot keep any one person from experiencing the benefits from the clean apartment, and therefore we may still have free riders. This does not solve the problem.

In the end, my roommates came up with the best solution. When sharing my idea with them, they replied: "We'll keep doing our chores, because then we can actually tell A to do her chores as well." They were taking it upon themselves to be the external enforcers** that the apartment needed to ensure that we were making the pareto-optimal move to live in a clean apartment. What a great idea!

*that is, everyone living in the apartment
**they are technically not "external enforcers" as they are also living in the apartment, but they are trusted to do their part, and I am assuming away any corruption.

The Median Voter Theorem and Hillary Clinton's views on the Trans-Pacific Partnership

The Trans-Pacific Partnership is a trade agreement among 12 countries on the Pacific Ocean aiming to promote trade by reducing or eliminating over 18,000 tariffs that act as a barrier to US trade with the other 11 nations. After years of negotiations, the TPP was agreed upon in February of this year, but has not yet been ratified by Congress. Hillary Clinton initially favored this agreement, stating in a 2010 speech that "we know that [the Trans-Pacific Partnership] will help create new jobs and opportunities here at home."

During her campaign in the Democratic primary for the upcoming election this year, though, Clinton faced Bernie Sanders, who openly objected to the Trans-Pacific Partnership. In order to remain competitive with Sanders among democratic voters on such a key topic for this election, Clinton began to shift her views on the TPP to the left. She claimed that she was against the agreement in a primary debate last October, announcing that it "didn't meet my standards."

Downs' Median Voter Theorem helps to explain Hillary Clinton's behavior here. If the median voter is decisive, then candidates will shift their views to be right at the median to ultimately win that determining vote. Clinton's initial view on the TPP was too far to the right for the audience from which she was campaigning to win votes, so she altered her position to better reflect the median voter's views, between Bernie Sanders and herself, regarding the issue of this trade agreement. This example supports Downs' claim that "parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies."