As I have done before, I enjoy applying theories of Public Choice to what I am learning in my Fall of Communism
class. The Soviet Union’s collapse was ultimately a result of its leaders
acting in their own self-interest. Given opposition movements in Eastern
Europe, domestic reforms and openness, and mounting nationalism in Soviet
republics, the Communist Party leaders realized that they could best preserve
their power by becoming what the people wanted, thus dissolving the Soviet
Union on December 8, 1991. In Armageddon
Averted, Stephen Kotkin writes, “It was the central elite, rather than the
independence movements of the periphery, that cashiered the Union” (107).
Ideology aside, Soviet leaders were rational,
utility-maximizing agents acting in political markets, just as Buchanan and
Tullock established as the foundation of public choice economics. More
specifically, their actions are consistent with Downs’ assumption of political
actors as vote-maximizers. Domestic reforms (in hopes of rejuvenating communism)
in the late 1980s increased the channels through which citizen voters could
reveal their preferences, including through public gatherings, published letters to the
editor, and independent political organization. Foreseeing their ideology’s doom,
Soviet leaders abandoned the Communist Party to become nationalist leaders. This
continuity was true for eight out of the fifteen newly independent nations. Consumed
with uncertainty, however, the following years would be plagued with policy
zigzags and troubled reform. As Downs argues, these individuals formulated
policies to win elections rather than won elections in order to formulate
policies. Ex-Communist leaders were vote-maximizers.