The Lengths to Prevent Employee Shirking

 Since the transition to work from home in March of 2020, there have been plenty of concerns surrounding employee shirking. Historically combative practices against shirking include monitoring, shorter contracts/frequent check-ins, having a well-defined output, and choice alternatives. Clearly, in-office work is a more practical setting to monitor employee behavior and ensure regular supervisor check-ins. Therefore, companies have attempted to find methods to recreate that since going fully online. The toy-brand company, Mattel, required job applicants to have a distraction-free environment (with no children, pets, or noise), a secluded office space dedicated to work, and an uncompensated supply of office supplies. The company also required at-home visits. These visits were described as unplanned visits to the employee’s home by a supervisor. These practices give less slack in an environment typically associated with slack, discouraging workers from misbehaving without consequence. While I understand that this is in attempt to prevent employees shirking, the recent success of productivity at home makes such drastic measures seem unnecessary. Working at home may lead to supervisors assuming laziness in their employees, but the trend shows quite the opposite. Sending in supervisors to check in on employees – inspecting their work environment and productivity – seems like an invasion of privacy that wasn’t present during in-office work. There are much better methods for management to ensure employee productivity and success without a breaching of trust like open and frequent communication through online check-ins and clear expectations about the job position. Employees should not be put in a position where their supervisors enter their homes to guarantee work completion.

On Being a Private, Ideological Voter

 

In our discussion of the Kalt & Zupan article, we talked about the role of ideology in voting. Ideology, defined as a system of beliefs that impacts the way that you view various issues/policies, can cause both voters and their representatives to vote against their pure economic interests and in favor of the so-called “public” interest. Voters may choose to oppose a strip mining bill, even though it would reduce energy costs, because of the damaging and unsightly effects it would have on the environment. They are empowered to vote against their economic interests because the costs of their decisions are widely dispersed, and there is a low probability that their vote will affect the outcome of the decision. 

Citizens “voting” in private markets, on the other hand, will inevitably be the deciding vote of any individual decision and will likely bear the entire cost of their choice. These circumstances make it more likely that consumers will - for example - buy  Nike shoes despite deploring their manufacturing practices. When we discussed this, I realized that I am an outlier among citizens “voting” in private markets; I weigh  ideology more heavily than the average consumer likely does. I came to this conclusion because of my unwillingness to use Amazon. 

For many people, including my parents, Amazon has replaced running errands. It saves time and personal transportation costs, while often providing cheaper prices than alternatives. In this way, it is in my and others’ economic interests to use Amazon for our purchases. However, I believe that Amazon can be harmful to the communities it enters. It can easily overpower and decimate small businesses; it promotes rampant consumerism; and it uses wasteful packaging and transportation processes. According to the Institute for Local Self-Reliance, more than half of American voters believe Amazon’s size makes it so dangerous that it should be broken up.  However, because they bear the whole cost of pursuing more costly alternatives, many of these voters continue to use Amazon. If possible, I don’t - showing the utility I get from ideological “voting” is higher than the utility I would get from pursuing my economic interest in this case. 

Virginia’s Median Voter: A White Woman

Virginia’s gubernatorial election has just finished with Glenn Youngkin beating Terry McAuliffe by about 2.5 percentage points, a swing of over 10 points compared to the 2020 election.  One of the largest swings was with white women, (40% of the electorate) which swung in favor of Youngkin by 13 points.  White women have a history of being an unreliable group but education was the issue that drove them to Youngkin.  Education was the top issue for 24% of white women and 84% of white women thought parents should have a say in what their child school’s teaches, an opinion seemingly not held by McAuliffe.  That alongside Youngkin’s stance against the recent scandals in Loudon County effectively courted the group towards him during the last month in the campaign.

The Median Voter Model states that the median voter will determine which candidate will win the election by voting for the candidate who most closely matches their values.  Since Youngkin won the election, (assuming no abstentions) we can assume the median voter voted for Youngkin. Given the timing of the education scandals, the concurrent rise of support for Youngkin by white women for his stance on education, the large proportion of the electorate white women make up, and the unreliability of white women to vote for either party, it is safe to assume a white woman was the median voter this past election.

Pennsylvania state Supreme Court election

    During the new Pennsylvania state Supreme Court justice election, special interest groups have spent over 5 million dollars, potentially even 6, on campaign funding for the two candidates. One of the candidates, Brobson, has even been reprimanded by the bar association due to the nature of his attack ads on his opponent being so disparaging and false. This election is not unlike past campaigns, as previous campaigns have received up to 22 million dollars from special interest groups so that their candidate wins the justice position. This amount of spending on candidates is concerning. It takes away the court's integrity as the benefactors are not donating out of goodwill instead to obtain rulings that benefit them later. 

    The special interest groups in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice election are self-interested actors who strive to capture regulation to benefit themselves. Special interests groups gaining too much power worried Olson. He believed that these groups being overly powerful would lead to the demise of the nation. Like Olson, the author of this article also believes that once special interest groups gain control of political or judicial systems, they lose their integrity. Individuals would be able to pay for outcomes in the courts they want, rather than the judicial process working. These groups are more effective than other parties (voters/citizens) as they can overcome organizational costs to achieve their goals. Unfortunately for Olson and the author, these special interest groups will continue to be more effective as they can place more pressure relative to the other groups (general voters/citizens).

The Prisoners Dilemma of Masking Up in Mem Gym

This past Sunday, I decided to dust off the 'halloweekend' cobwebs by going to Memorial Gym for a workout, and I saw something that made the Public Choice alarm bells in my head go off. 

As we all know, UVA has made the decision to continue the policy of forcing masks to be worn inside university buildings for the rest of the semester. This affects me most in classroom and gym settings, and without going into my personal feelings, the low COVID case count in the student population combined with the high rate of vaccination is leading many students to feel like the policy is unnecessary. I go into this because during my time in Mem gym, I noticed that around a third of the students working out were deliberately wearing masks improperly, and some were not wearing them at all and were not being asked to wear them properly by the staff. 

I feel that this situation is a prisoner's dilemma, where the use of policing has been effective, but the policing has begun to cease in the latter part of the semester. I feel that this is a prisoner's dilemma because the dominant strategy of individual exercisers leads to a non-pareto-optimal outcome for everyone in the gym. I see not wearing a mask over one's mouth and nose is a dominant strategy for exercise, because the restriction of breath makes exercise more difficult and/or less enjoyable for most people, and not wearing a mask is seen as better than this. However, gym-goers pursuing this dominant strategy all at once creates a non-pareto-optimal situation for everyone, which is creating a greater risk of COVID spread. (The article makes the point that masks are necessary for exercise, as well as that they are inconvenient for vigorous exercise)

The implications of what I observed on Sunday are that policing is necessary to achieve the pareto-optimal result of minimizing COVID spread, and that we consented to this policing by coming to school this year. Due to fatigue, and less COVID on grounds, however, the policing by gym staff has ceased, and the supposed pareto-optimal condition the policy aims to achieve has been lost. I have continued to comply with mask wearing, but if I am to face no consequences by pursuing my dominant strategy, I will gladly work out without my mask, and bring everyone farther from pareto-optimality. 

Dairy Farmers as an Interest Group

The phrase "got milk?" is well-known around just about every age group in the United States. Commercials, advertisements, radio announcements, and more all promoted drinking milk for stronger bones for years, and many of us can remember them vividly from our childhood. Further, milk is commonly promoted in school lunchrooms, with the federal government making changes allowing for fattier milks in cafeterias as recently as the Trump Administration. These instances signal the success of the dairy industry's interest groups, but which take on the size of these groups prevails in this instance?

The main distinction is that Olson would argue that the dairy industry must be small, as it would more easily overcome its organizational problems and succeed. On the other hand, Becker would assert that the industry must be large, as this plays a much larger role in his formula for success than Olson's. It turns out that Olson is more correct in this case. In recent history the amount of dairy farms has been steadily decreasing, with the number of dairy operations falling over 55% from 2003 to present. There are currently less than 32,000 left. This means that even with the size of this interest group getting smaller and smaller, their success is still prevalent across the U.S., which Olson would say is because of their smaller organizational costs.

The U.S. Beef Industry as and Intermediate Group

In 2018, four companies slaughtered around 85% of grain-fed cattle in the U.S. The big four processers are Cargill, Tyson Foods, JBS SA, and National Beefpacking Co. With these four firms controlling over 80% of beef slaughtering industry (it depends how you break down the meat industry, but almost any breakdown has these four firms as the dominant firms), they constitute an oligopy. Specifically, since there's no one large firm, they can be classified as an "intermediate" group. The lobbying patterns of the industry support this, with no one firm dominating lobbying, and Tyson Foods and JBS having spent the most and third-most on political lobbying in the general meatpacking industry in 2021. 

Lobbying across the past 20 years by the industry has also shaped a lot of the legislation with Tyson itself spending $25 million across that timeframe. The lobbying supported specific members of Congress who have voted against climate change legislation and cap-and-trade systems, both of which would force a reduction in meat production or capital investment in greener meat production, ultimately affecting bottom-line profits of the companies. Funnily enough, Clinton was even nicknamed "Chicken Man" becuase of Tyon's support for him during his presidential runs. These lobbing efforts by the oligopolistic industry work to capture favorable regulation for the meat industry. Both the oligopolistic industry structure and the lobbying patterns and efforts of the industry provide a strong example of Olson's "intermediate" groups and of the Stigler-Peltzman Model of Regulation.