Wednesday, November 18, 2026

A $24 Million Dinner Party

    The fiscal year for the Federal Government runs from Oct 1- Sep 30. This means that for many agencies, September is the time to go shopping. If agencies have any left over budget, they are incentivized to spend it all. Why? Because these agencies operate under a “use-it-or-lose-it” system. There is no benefit in saving money, as agencies lose that budget on Oct 1. Not only is an agency leaving money on the table by not spending, but it risks future budget cuts if legislators see that it is not utilizing its entire budget. The agency’s incentive is not to maximize efficiency, but rather to spend the entire budget. 

    In September 2025, the Department of Defense spent $93.4 billion on grants and contracts in September, compared with an average of $28.9 billion in spending across other months. Whether these September contracts are all necessary is perhaps unclear. Some agencies wait until the end of the fiscal year to make large, but necessary purchases. But other forms of discretionary spending do not paint as favorable a picture for the DoD. In September 2025 , the agency spent $6.9 million on lobster tail, $15.1 million on ribeyes, and $2 million on Alaskan king crab. While I may not be a defense expert, $24 million on premium protein options does not seem to be the most efficient way to achieve Secretary Hegseth’s goal of promoting “maximum lethality, not tepid legality.” 


    But the department can get away with inefficient spending because of its monopoly power and the ambiguity of its output. Deference is given to agency bureaucrats, as it is difficult for legislators and the public to accurately measure exact agency output. And even if they could, there is no alternative for legislators to turn to. Therefore, bureaucratic waste will be tolerated so long as it remains less than the value the agency provides. So for Secretary Hegseth, keep buying that king crab.

Monday, November 16, 2026

When Politicians No Longer Have to Answer to Their Constituents

Following the November 3rd election results, Congress entered what is known as the "lame-duck" session, where members of the outgoing Congress are still in office before the new Congress is sworn in. This year, Republicans have control of Congress until January 3rd, when Democrats will gain control of both houses. Research has shown that members leaving Congress are more likely to ignore the desires of their constituents. For example, Congresswoman Liz Cheney lost her Republican primary in 2022 and proceeded to vote with Democrats on multiple bills and endorse Democratic candidates, despite representing an overwhelmingly Republican district in Wyoming.

This creates an interesting principal-agent problem between the voters, who are the principal, and the representatives, who are the agents. In regular Congressional sessions, voters can monitor their politicians through the legislative actions they take and can then punish them by voting them out of office. Once an election has passed, however, representatives that lost or announced retirement face little to no consequences for going against their constituents' preferences. Kalt and Zupan's concept of ideological consumption helps explain why politicians may take advantage of this. They argue that politicians acquire utility from using their political power to create what they believe is a "good" society. Without the pressure from reelection, politicians have more opportunities to engage in shirking because they face decreased costs when pursuing their personal ideologies. This is also true because constituents face significant costs if they monitor their representatives actions, which creates slack that gives politicians more freedom with less consequence. The lame-duck session provides opportunities for politicians to prioritize their own ideological interests, which we may see in the next few weeks as the 119th Congress ends.

Be Careful Drinking the Northwestern Mutual Coolaid

Over the summer, I worked as a financial representative intern at Northwestern Mutual. I quickly learned that 'financial representative' is another name for 'insurance salesman'. Financial advisors operate on a commission basis. Some advisors charge a fee-for-service, but this is often a small percentage of their compensation package. Subsequently, there lies a clear incentive for financial advisors to sell expensive insurance policies that may not be in the best interest of the client. Additionally, advisors hold more information about the growth and costs of insurance policies than their clients. Accordingly, advisors may be tempted to leverage this information asymmetry in order to make a sale, or advise their clients to implement insurance-heavy financial plans that would maximize the advisor’s compensation. Brooklynn Chandler Willy, a 46 year old financial advisor from Texas took this to the extreme by convincing her unsuspecting clients to invest in her Ponzi scheme. Brooklynn took advantage of the fact that her clients lacked the financial capability to track their capital and used that to generate short term profits for herself. 

The principal-agent problem and issue of asymmetric information are the same problems that politicians faced with log-rolling. In the United States, members of Congress created committees to mitigate these issues. There are also institutions in place to mitigate the principal-agent problem in financial advisory.  Large insurance sales are often reviewed by underwriters who possess exclusive monopoly power in the form of a unilateral veto. Additionally, the underwriter holds the insurer to their end of the bargain, limiting ex-post negotiations, and enforcing the payment of claims. Underwriters provide a similar solution to the principal-agent problem in the insurance industry as committees do in Congress. 

Sunday, November 15, 2026

Till Debt do us Part

One of my family friends recently got married and had a really beautiful wedding. Since organizing a wedding is such a complicated process, he and his wife hired a professional wedding planner with the expectation that the planner would make the best decisions on their behalf. After all, wedding planners are supposed to have the experience and knowledge necessary to organize a memorable wedding while staying within the couple's budget. However, when I learned the average wedding costs $36,000, I began wondering whether the planner's interests are really aligned with the couple's, or if this is a classic principle agent problem.


In weddings, the couple represents the principal, while the wedding planner is the agent hired to act in their interests. The couple's objective is to have a successful wedding while maximizing the value of their budget. However, the planner may have different incentives, such as earning commissions from certain vendors, maintaining relationships with expensive venues, or simply minimizing their own workload. For example, a planner might recommend a more expensive florist because they receive a referral commission, even when a less expensive option would provide comparable quality.


There inherently exists a considerable amount of slack because the couple has little experience to judge whether these recommendations are genuinely in their best interest, or if the planner is shirking. Couples hire wedding planners to maximize the value of their wedding, but there is a good chance they will end up paying for decisions that maximize the planner's own interests instead.


Live Free or Die Driving

American license plates serve as state ideological billboards, with drivers identifying with the "Green Mountain State" (VT), "Empire State" (NY), and "Spirit of America" (MA) on their rear. The most striking on-wheels billboard is that of New Hampshire, with "Live Free or Die" (LFoD) posted in bold, green, all-capital letters at the top of its rectangular metal frame. With no motorcycle helmet or seatbelt (18+) requirements, New Hampshire drivers certainly live in accordance with such ideology. Earlier this year, with the suspension of the vehicle safety inspection program, this automotive liberty was pushed to unprecedented bounds. Such extreme legislation can be explained by this week's discussion of Ideological Capture and Logrolling.

NH Republican/LFoD ideology publicly paints annual inspections as a "scam that mostly benefits auto dealers and mechanics" who make large profits on predatory repair costs. Republican Representatives formulating legislation and voting against the special interests of the lucrative auto industry, in support of their constituent interests (ideologies) and everyday NH consumers, supports Kalt and Zupan's concept of "Impure Ideology" as managerial rule of thumb in the political economy. To pass the Bill via majority rule (after a failed standalone State Senate attempt), Republicans strategically added it as a "rider" on the HB 2 State Budget Bill, as a means of facilitating logrolling: if Democrats/LFoD-leaning Representatives wanted the State Budget passed, they had to consequently vote "yea" for the suspension of safety inspections. Such a strategy was brilliant in that it created Simultaneous Exchange, and effectively, a binding contract that eliminated Weingast and Marshall's fear of ex-post opportunism.  

AI Talking to AI

With the pervasiveness of AI in university students' college assignments, there has also been a parallel rise in the use of AI incorporation in classes as professors work to understand how this tool can be utilized to supplement teaching and help students learn. Whether it be Claude-generated slides or ChatGPT outlines, it seems some professors have truly embraced and employed generative AI's abilities to create just as students have. In the Spring 2026 semester, I experienced this myself, as every paper I submitted for a politics seminar received lengthy, detailed, -- but clearly AI -- feedback.

My professor's decision to use AI to generate the entirety of his feedback on our assignments represents a clear principal-agent problem; my classmates and I would have certainly preferred self-written feedback from a respected faculty member with his well-informed insights on political theory and experience having researched the topic of our seminar for decades. However, our interests as the principal(s) paying tuition did not seem to align with the interests of our tenured professor. Due to his high opportunity cost of reviewing our assignments and providing feedback, he chose instead to save his resources of time and effort by simply pasting our work into ChatGPT and copying the responses into our Canvas comments. 

With the high amount of slack our professor had in providing feedback, especially considering that students are not necessarily even entitled to receive feedback on our assignments, our professor was able to practice shirking due to the limited monitoring abilities of students over our professor's, or the agent's, actions in this situation. With the only performance review being at the end of the semester, when students reflect on the class, there were limited options to limit the slack given to the agent, and some of my classmates even began submitting AI papers on our public discussion boards without consequence. The ethics of AI-generated professor feedback leaves much room for debate, but if that debate consists of AI arguing with AI, count me out!

Coase and Coasts

In 2023, Quidnessett Country Club erected a massive stone wall to preserve their iconic 14th hole after years of tidewater erosion. The public was outraged. Rhode Islanders consider shoreline access to be part of their state’s identity, and this principle of access goes all the way back to King Charles II. Naturally, the attorney general filed suit against the club in May. 


A Coasian solution would be difficult to use here but not for the typical reasons. The property rights are clear as the state owns the beach, and there are just two parties, the state and the club. Instead, the obstacle is that public trust land is effectively unsellable. There’s constitutionally no room for a bargaining process. This does not, however, mean that we can’t use Coase.


His work stresses the reciprocal nature of social costs and how avoiding harm on B (public fishers) inflicts harm on A (the club). For Coase, the central problem is “to avoid the more serious harm.” He gives an example of the inevitable externality of cattle straying from their field to eat a neighbor's crops. He doesn’t immediately ask how much the cattle raiser should pay the planter. No, there is a choice: meat or crops, and which is more important. 


Using the Coasian, not Pigouvian, lens to look at the problem, the government should permit Quidnessett to bargain for the purchase of this small portion of the beach head. Before the wall’s erection the beach appeared to be scarcely used and is surely of significantly less value than the sinking, championship golf course. As expected though, this has more or less turned into a political opportunity for local government officials to feel important and wag fingers at a snooty country club, while helping no one. 



(Footnote: The same happened with Shinnecock before the 2018 US Open, when club member Michael Bloomberg offered to give local schools $1 million and local infrastructure $6 million, if the town of Southampton could reroute traffic to St Andrews Road from Tuckahoe road which cuts through the club’s 12th hole.)

Jensen Huang: NVIDIA's Chief Shirker

In a recent press release, NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang confessed that he had fallen short of his responsibilities to the company. As co-founder and CEO of the highly valued company at the center of the U.S.-China AI race, Huang was trusted with advancing the interests of NVIDIA’s shareholders. Instead, through an extramarital affair with Alice Huang, an executive suspected of having ties to Chinese intelligence, his conduct raised national security concerns, prompted congressional scrutiny, and exposed the company to serious financial risk. In other words, Huang had shirked his duties as an agent, acting against the interests of the principals he was hired to serve. This is a classic principal-agent problem. As CEO, Huang maintained considerable control over NVIDIA through a highly centralized management structure. Moreover, shareholders were dispersed and individually had little incentive to monitor him closely. To say the least, Huang enjoyed substantial institutional slack.

Unfortunately, as Kalt and Zupan predicted, slack resulted in shirking. However, Huang’s motivation differed from the two forms of shirking they describe. Rather than pursuing financial gain or an ideological vision, Huang appears to have acted out of personal gratification. This points to a broader application of their argument. Kant and Zupan show that agents may derive utility from ideological pursuits and prioritize that satisfaction over both their own and their constituents' economic interests. Yet, ideology is only one possible source of nonpecuniary utility. An agent, such as Huang, may also derive utility from personal gratification and pursue it despite the economic costs. If ideology can enter an agent’s utility function, so can less virtuous private desires. 

I can rationalize pecuniary shirking: it is, at least, opportunistic. And I can almost respect ideological shirking: legislators who engage in it believe they are pursuing some conception of the public good. Yet, Huang’s case suggests a more troubling possibility: agents shirk simply to satisfy private non-monetary desires. If legislators do the same, the problem is not merely that they might pursue policies their constituents oppose; it is that they may use the authority entrusted to them for purposes entirely unrelated to the public good.

Shirking in the Palmetto State

In one of the biggest upsets in this November’s elections, Democrat Annie Andrews defeated Republican Darline Graham in South Carolina, a state that voted for Donald Trump by 18 points. A pediatrician, Annie Andrews’s campaign stressed her moderate governance style, with focus on reducing taxes, balancing the budget, and securing the border. In a conservative state such as South Carolina, swing voters held their nose and opted for a moderate, median-voter-appeasing Democrat over Andrews’s opponent, an ally of the deeply unpopular Trump.

Yet, since the election, videos have surfaced online revealing that Andrews’s ideology maps more closely with blue-state Democratic policies. In these videos, Andrews expresses her support for transgender children, gun control, and healthcare reform. In Democratic-leaning states, these stances are popular, and often required for candidates to win. However, in South Carolina, the conservative-leaning median voter would not support these policy positions.

Regardless, in large part due to rational ignorance by these voters (they did not expend the effort to find these videos), Andrews won her race, and will remain in the Senate for six years. During this time, it is probable that Andrews shirks, voting according to her ideology rather than the economic interests of the conservative-leaning South Carolina voters. This result represents the principal-agent problem that is more common in Congress’s upper chamber, and the slack granted to Senators by the legislature’s institutional arrangement. Given the infrequent elections in the Senate, Andrews can vote according to her ideology until her re-election campaign begins, when it becomes increasingly valuable for voters to monitor her actions. At least during the first half of her term, Andrews need not concern herself with perfect representation of the state, since it is too costly for voters to monitor their representatives if the next election is half a decade in the future. Until then, the Democrats have a safe vote from the Palmetto State.

The Multiple-Principal Problem in the EU (Extension of the Principal-Agent Problem)

 

The principal-agent problem states that an agent (representatives) tends to diverge from the principal’s (voters’) interest by acting in ways not consistent with the preferences of the principal, or “shirk”. This is a major issue in the U.S. Politics that halt efficient public allocation but what if there is actually a much worse scenario in the world. The European Union is often characterized as having the multiple-principal problem commonly known as "serving two masters” undermining effective policymaking. This characteristic of the organization makes it extremely hard and lengthy to see real results due to the two levels of agents representing constituents on the European level and each corresponding national level. 


The Green Deal is something most commonly associated as a major policy framework of the European Union. The member states agree on environmental objectives on the EU level in order to fulfill the requirements of this bill, but individual governments are responsible for implementing many of the policies on their corresponding national level. The two “masters” in this case are the legislation on the overall EU level and then the passing of the law in the government of each member state. This allows a single national government to have incentives to delay implementation, avoid expensive regulations, or prioritize other domestic economic interests. To compare, statistical research shows that the United States can enact a law much faster showing the greater level of bureaucracy present in the European Union. Although the EU serves as a centralized representative of the collective interests of its 27 member states, it continues to lack direct control over many aspects over policy implementation in each country part of the alliance. This widening gap between collective decision-making on the EU level and decentralized national implementation results in the pursuit of domestic interests at the expense of shared European objectives.


Airbnb VS The Hotel Industry

 Stigler's work tells us that regulation is the friend of the incumbent, and this could not be exemplified better than by Local Law 18 in New York City, passed in early 2022. Rising concerns about housing affordability lead policy makers to consider enforcing a much older law requiring short term rentals under 30 days to register with the city, of which only about 200 were permitted. If they were permitted, the host had to be in the apartment for the duration of the stay --- a de facto ban on Airbnb in NYC. Unsurprisingly, this was not a bill of pure intention -- the hotel lobby spent millions, 20 times more than Airbnb, on getting this regulation passed, surely not for the virtue of rent decreases. 

Post-regulation, the lobbying investment paid back dividends. Revenue in the industry increased by about $2.5 billion due to this regulation, and daily prices went up by about $17 a night without any meaningful change in cost. Regulation was captured well.

What's worse is that the rent failed to decline. It seems that a regulation of Airbnb's either forced them into illegal activity, or the supply of housing is so large that the apartments converted from short term rentals to actual homes was a mere drop in the bucket. Policy makers professed good intentions, yet they raised prices for consumers and handed barrels of cash to the hotel industry.

No Wasted Paper

After our class discussion about Weingast and Marshall’s paper on the benefits of the committee system, I decided to take a look at the Senate website to see a list of the different committees. Although there were some that sounded familiar, there were many that I didn’t even know existed, such as the Joint Committee on Printing.

Founded in 1846, the Joint Committee on Printing is one of the oldest joint committees in Congress, which means that it includes members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. It cannot bring bills to the floor, and instead, its responsibilities include overseeing the US Government Publishing Office and ensuring that federal agencies comply with “laws, rules and regulations designed to minimize printing costs to the American people.” 

At first, I was bemused that people would want to be on this committee. However, I then remembered Weingast and Marshall’s assertion that Congressional committees are made up of “preference outliers.” To be selected for the JCP, one must be on either the House Committee on House Administration or the Senate Committee on Rules and Regulations, suggesting that the individuals on the JCP might already care more than the average legislator that everyone in the government is following the rules. In more economic terms, they have a comparative advantage, because they perceive being on the JCP as having a lower net opportunity cost than their peers, who would rather spend their time on more influential committees. But as a taxpayer, I am grateful for the JCP’s hard work ensuring my dollars aren’t being wasted on excessive federal printing.


Denmark doesn’t need Committee Vetoes as an Enforcer



    Weingast and Marshall’s model says legislators can’t trust plain vote trades, because future legislatures aren’t bound by today’s deals, so Congress uses monopoly control through committees to make bargains stick. Studying abroad in Denmark, I was exposed to a whole different type of government. They have many different political parties and a much more homogenous population. Because of this, Denmark gets durability a different way, and the Green Tripartite is a clear example.

    In November 2024, Denmark’s major parties agreed on the details of the world’s first carbon tax on livestock emissions, starting in 2030. The deal was worked out by the government with part of the opposition and representatives of farmers, industry and unions, and even though the government already had a majority, it was expected to try to bring in more parties. The point is that a broad coalition is meant to keep the deal standing for many years. Using continued relation as an incentive to follow through and therefore the enforcer Weingast talks about. As the model would predict, someone is left out: one opposition MP said many people would lose their jobs. Farmers bear the cost, and the deal is politically binding, not legally binding. So Denmark isn’t enforcing the bargain with committee vetoes. It’s making sure nobody has a reason to break it.

All Roads Lead to Appropriations

Looking at the committees Rhode Island Senator Jack Reed (who lives in my hometown) serves on, I saw he serves on the Senate Appropriations Committee, which is considered one of the most powerful in Congress. It oversees federal government spending across virtually all policies from agriculture to defense. Since virtually every government program requires funding, the committee has influence across nearly every policy area and therefore gives its members considerably more power than those serving on committees with narrower jurisdictions. This creates opportunities for pork barrel spending, where legislators direct federal funds toward projects benefiting their constituents. For example, in 2005, per capita federal spending in Alaska was double the national average while its senator, Ted Stevens, chaired Appropriations (mentioned in source above). Reed is also the ranking member of its Financial Services and General Government Subcommittee, which makes him its highest-ranking minority-party member.

This relates to Weingast and Marshall's argument that legislators seek committee assignments based on their constituents' interests and incentives for reelection. Condition 2 of their model establishes a seniority system in which longer continuous committee service provides access to leadership positions. This helps explain Reed's position as ranking member especially given that he first joined Appropriations in 2001. They also argue that committees tend to be composed of preference outliers, which are legislators who have preferences for a particular policy jurisdiction more than the average legislator. However, Appropriations complicates this idea because almost every legislator has an incentive to bring federal spending back to their constituents regardless of their state's particular interests. Appropriations' broad jurisdiction makes it valuable to legislators with different preferences, which leads to increased competition for limited seats. W&M's bidding mechanism suggests legislators must weigh benefits of membership against their chances of securing a seat and opportunity cost of pursuing another committee. This leads me to wonder, since Appropriations benefits virtually every legislator's reelection prospects, are its members really preference outliers, or simply those who value access to federal spending the most?

Friday, November 13, 2026

The Business of Being Informed

When taking a step back to critically evaluate the news we consume, we're usually left to wonder why it so often seems sensationalized and emotionally charged. Seldom are news stories presented that don't elicit a strong, sometimes visceral, emotional reaction. The reason behind this is best understood in the context of the principal-agent problem. 

In this scenario, the agent is the news company, and the principal is the consumer of their news. The interests of the news company are to maximize profits in the name of maximizing shareholder value. The interests of the news consumers are different; their interests are to be informed, often about American politics. Therefore, the interests of news companies and of news consumers are different, creating a principal-agent problem. What results is news companies shirking, or displaying news not for the sake of informing their viewers, but for the sake of maximizing shareholder value. In order to do so, news companies must maximize their viewership, thereby maximizing ad revenue. The best way they've found to do this is creating sensationalized and emotionally charged news that elicits strong reactions and keeps viewers entertained. As a result, American news shows have devolved into entertainment programs masquerading as sources of information. In the principal-agent context, it's plausible that this is merely the slack that exists between informative and entertaining reporting. If that's the case, as consumers, we ought not to allow such significant slack to exist.

Thursday, November 12, 2026

Rocky Mountain High (On the Hill)

     My brother currently serves as a Legislative Correspondent for the House of Representatives for the office of Joe Neguse, a representative from Colorado. This immediately came to mind while reading Weingast & Marshall because Representative Neguse sits on the House Committee on Natural Resources and is the ranking member of its Federal Lands subcommittee. This is interesting because over 36% of the state of Colorado is federally owned, while the average state percentage is around 15% federally owned, meaning Colorado, and its constituents, have a particularly strong stake in federal land and natural resource policy. Looking at the other states represented on this committee, many share this characteristic. The committee is largely composed of states with substantial natural resource interests, such as Oregon, which has three of its six representatives on the committee, and Alaska, which has its sole member on the committee. This pattern is consistent with Weingast & Marshall’s argument that congressional committees are composed of “preference outliers”, as representatives from states with particularly strong natural resource interests are likely to favor distinctly different policies in that realm than the median member of the House. 

    Representative Neguse likely has an incentive to serve on this committee because he has a comparative advantage in natural resource policy given its relevance to his constituents. The opportunity cost of dedicating his time to this area is relatively low, since advocating for favorable natural resource policy is likely to benefit his reelection prospects. However, this specialization extends beyond Representative Neguse himself. My brother often speaks about how most of his office spends a significant amount of time working on policy related to natural resources. This demonstrates that comparative advantage within a particular policy area is reflected not only in representatives’ respective committee assignments, but also in how they allocate staff resources within their offices.


Slipping Over the Line

I’ve had a hard time understanding how rent-seeking could even be considered legal. Part of this confusion probably stems from growing up in a developing country. Poorer countries dont have enough information, resources, or strong institutions to keep “legal” rent-seeking clearly separate from corruption. This week, Paraguay showed me exactly why the line is so hard to see.

On November 5, President Santiago Peña resigned shortly before facing an impeachment trial, amid the crisis set off by the government’s intervention in Ueno Bank, a private bank he had been linked to. Peña had been part of the bank’s shareholder group. Soon after taking office in 2023, he named Carlos Carvallo, then Ueno’s top executive, as head of the Central Bank, the institution that regulates banks like Ueno. The bank also managed up to $850 million in public funds, according to its own figures.

Appointing an industry insider as a regulator is legal. A private bank holding public deposits is legal too. Both fit the logic of rent-seeking: a connected firm gaining an advantage through political access instead of competition. But if public money was steered to the bank because of personal ties, or if supervision was deliberately weakened, the exact same actions become corruption. Prosecutors have detained eight executives, and that’s what investigators are now trying to determine. In other words, rent-seeking and corruption use the same tools: connections, appointments, and access to public resources. In theory, the line between them is the law. In practice, what separates them isn’t the action itself, but whether a specific rule was broken and whether anyone can prove it. That depends on how strong a country’s laws and enforcement are. It also explains why, in countries with strong institutions like the U.S., rent-seeking can stay legal and out in the open, while in countries with weaker institutions, it can slip into corruption more easily

Tuesday, November 10, 2026

Student Self-Governance, Slack, and Ideological Shirking

From orientation and beyond, UVA students are told about one of our University's core values: student self governance. Near the close of each semester, many CIOs gear up for elections for their club leaders and revise their constitutions, and as someone with a front-row seat to the highs and lows of student self governance in action, slack and shirking are on my mind. There are some fundamental differences that impact the principal agent problem in student and CIO government. Unlike the Senate, student-representatives have far more frequent check-ins with our electorate; most roles on CIOs, Student Council, and Honor only last one academic year at most. With students vying for resume building roles, graduations forcing ends to terms, and incoming classes bringing fresh representatives, there are often MANY options for who voters can elect. The numerous options and one-year terms reduces slack, which in an ideal world minimizes the principal agent problem. Student-voters have very busy lives, and they probably are not taking much time to monitor the actions of their student-representatives, be it for their CIOs or Student Council. On top of that, the inner workings of student government is a lot murkier since there is less oversight and publicly released information about the voting patterns of our student-representatives, especially for CIOs. This lack of monitoring options and the idea of rational ignorance provides additional slack to many members of student government. 

A s CIO elections approach, I worry most about ideological shirking within CIOs, both amongst agents and their principals. as student-representatives govern their CIOs, their own ideologies, goals, and relationships can sway their decisions away from what is best for the club as a whole. A few passionate members of a executive board can reshape a club in their own vision around their values, for better or for worse. These often tight-knit groups can be full of tight relationships, and student-voters often use their friendships with potential student-representatives as a proxy for ideology, and therefore a proxy for policy and performance. Popular, but sometimes not as well qualified, agents will be elected by their principals. Problems with poor leadership within CIOs can lead to the disorganization and sometimes even the downfall of an org, largely caused by ideological voting. With more than 800 CIOs, some ideological shirking is inevitable. Luckily, UVA students are generally bright, deeply involved, and care about their impact on the community. Student self governance exposes all of us to the wonders of public choice in action at a small but meaningful scale. 

Monday, November 09, 2026

Olson Can Explain Why the Chicago Bears May Become the Hammond Bears

As an avid Chicago Bears fan, I, along with the entire city, am experiencing Olson's worst nightmare. Currently, the Bears are leveraging both Illinois and Indiana against each other in negotiations for a new stadium, despite the entire fanbase wanting to stay in Chicago. In 2021, the team purchased a 326-acre site in Arlington Heights, Illinois, and in 2022 unveiled a nearly $5 billion plan for an enclosed stadium. However, the team's infrastructure requests at the Arlington Heights site amounted to roughly $855 million in taxpayer funds. A property-tax bill the team supported passed the Illinois House 78–32 in April 2026 but ultimately failed to become law. Meanwhile, Indiana lawmakers advanced legislation clearing the way for a Bears stadium in Hammond, Indiana, giving the team additional leverage against Illinois. Illinois leaders are now preparing another proposal for the veto session beginning November 17. Taking a step back, fans who want the Bears to stay in Chicago are all anxiously awaiting the next headline and praying we don't move to Indiana. But therein lies the problem: we are largely spectators, while the Bears are actively organizing, lobbying, and negotiating to secure the best possible deal for themselves.

This situation closely follows Olson's theory that small, concentrated interest groups have a much easier time organizing around their economic interests than large, dispersed groups. The Bears have enormous financial incentives to lobby and negotiate with both states, while the potential costs of public subsidies are distributed across millions of taxpayers. Public opinion illustrates this disconnect. A 2025 University of Chicago poll found that 68% of Chicago residents considered keeping the Bears in the city important, yet 65% opposed spending any public money to accomplish that goal. In other words, while residents collectively value keeping the team, relatively few are willing to support the financial commitment necessary to pursue it. This is Olson's free-rider problem: individuals have little incentive to organize and contribute toward a collective objective when they can benefit from the outcome regardless. Meanwhile, the Bears have no collective-action problem. They have a concentrated financial interest, the resources to organize, and the ability to play two state governments against each other. Ultimately, it is the Bears who will have more influence over the stadium's future than the millions of fans and taxpayers who just like Olson, are laying awake at night.

Sunday, November 08, 2026

"A message to every billionaire megadonor, every trillionaire megadonor." - Talarico

After thinking about the midterms on Tuesday, I wanted to apply our discussion of interest groups to Elon Musk. Musk is essentially an interest group by himself. As the world's richest man, he has the financial resources and political connections to pursue favorable legislation for his companies. He moved his businesses to Texas for its business friendly policies and lower costs. As Stigler 71 explains, acquiring favorable regulation requires votes and dollars, and Musk has tried to supply both. 

This year he spent at least $474 million supporting Republican candidates in the midterms. However, his preferred candidates lost several major races, including Ken Paxton's Senate race and Greg Abbott's gubernatorial race in Texas. Nearly half a billion dollars later, Musk has very little to show for it. Under Abbott, his companies received billions in tax incentives and benefited from legislation giving them advantages over other businesses. One shameless example was when Texas rewrote its corporate laws to give his Starbase operation the legal right to shut down a nearby public beach and highway. With the incoming administration promising to end preferential treatment, Musk will likely lose a large amount of money.

 Olson argues that smaller, concentrated groups have an advantage in political organization because their members have more to gain from collective action. Musk takes this idea to its extreme. He has the resources of an entire interest group without worrying about free riders or coordinating thousands of members. Yet, this election demonstrates that money alone cannot guarantee political influence. Perhaps this is enough to give Olson a little peace of mind. Even the world's richest man cannot simply buy the political outcomes he wants.

La Dolce Vita? The Economics of Italian Train Strikes

Last semester, I studied abroad in Florence, Italy. During my time there, I experienced numerous train delays due to strikes organized by unions.

It wasn't apparent then, but now I see that how Friedman's rulemaker and umpire regulates different interest groups dictates how they are able to behave significantly: Italian labor unions have significantly more influence than in the US.

 

Another factor impacting union behavior is the number of members and groups involved. There are six transport labor unions participating in strikes tomorrow for better pay and working conditions; a higher group number leads to a greater probability for an employee to find a group tailored to their individual preferences. This differs from the US, where there is on average one union that functions as the "exclusive bargaining unit" for a given workplace. In Italy, union membership comprises around 1/3 of overall workers compared to only about 10% of workers in the US.

 

The costs of the strikes can fall on several different groups, from one as large as one of the rail companies that suffers great monetary losses to one as small as study abroad students like myself whose trip was delayed.

 

Non-union members still receive contract benefits if labor unions' strikes are successful, which creates a free rider problem because people can receive the benefits union members pay for through their time striking and instead receive wages from working on the day of the strike. People can also be members of the union and do the same, but there is likely more social pressure from within the group incentivizing members to strike. 


Although the free rider problem is more prevalent in large groups, when a union engages in strikes it is more effective as group size increases. The transport unions, for instance, are more effective because they're composed of individuals working at train stations across Italy rather than a single station. The selective incentives from union membership include personal representation, discounted legal assistance, and fee reductions for tax returns.

 

No individual benefactor exists like in a privileged group to influence the contractual change that achieves the optimal amount of rent in a way a large group can in a strike.

Why Care About Corn?

The National Corn Growers Association (NCGA) is an interest group that has over 40,000 dues-paying corn growers in the U.S. and has affiliated organizations in 27 states. Their main mission from their website is “to help protect and advance corn growers’ interests.” Specifically, the organization focuses on ethanol, trade, biobased economy, farm bill, and animal agriculture among other issues. To make an impact, the organization promotes research in these areas, advocates and lobbies on behalf of corn farmers, and spreads educational content for corn producers. The cost of membership for members differs from state to state, but it typically ranges from $20-$50. Along with benefits from the organization's political efforts, members can expect to receive other selective incentives, like access to exclusive webinars and reports with insights by NCGA’s chief economist, college scholarships for children of members, and discounts at Bass Pro Shops and Cabela’s.

Currently, the organization is fighting for year-round E15, which the organization says would increase the demand for corn by ~2.4 billion bushels annually. With this increased demand, the price of corn would increase, directly benefiting all corn farmers. An estimate for the benefit of year-round E15 to a farmer who has equal parts corn and soybean is $5 per acre and the average corn farmer has 278 acres of corn, so the estimated benefit per corn/soybean farmer would be $1,390. Unlike the selective incentives mentioned earlier, these benefits would not be restricted to members of the organizations, so the benefits are available to all 500,000 total corn farmers in the United States. Based on these numbers, this means that there are a significant number of farmers who are able to free ride off of the benefits of the NCGA’s lobbying efforts, considering there are only 40,000 paying members. 

Lastly, looking at how this would impact consumers, it could actually lower fuel prices at gas stations; however, it is likely that they could see higher food prices due to the pass through from higher corn prices. It is also known that E15 provides worse mileage than alternatives which counters the benefit seen at the pump. Ultimately, the small costs are spread across many people, and they are also hard for people to see, which creates very little incentive to organize an effort against corn farmer interest groups.


The Persistence of the Penny

Soon, the days of making wishes in fountains, "take a penny, leave a penny" dishes, and the many idioms involving pennies will come to an end. This is all because as of November 12th of 2025, new pennies are no longer being minted. The stat that it costs over 3 cents to make each penny had been thrown around for nearly a decade before the penny began to meet its demise. This is because of one corporation's lobbying efforts: Artazn, a zinc company, was the supplier of the blank coins that would be minted into all of the pennies in circulation. This Tennessee based company maintained a chokehold on the penny, and on the legislators that allowed it to continue to be minted, by spending nearly $3 million since 2006 on the lobbying firm Americans for Common Cents. Since Artazn was a privileged group, it recognized the value of protecting its revenue stream and wasn't bogged down by the free rider problem or need selective incentives. Given how niche of an issue this was, it was enough to prolong the creation of pennies by nearly two decades.

It seems like Olson would not have been pro penny. The benefits were very concentrated for this pressure group: since 2008, the U.S. Treasury has paid the company more than $1.3 billion since 2008 to produce the blank coins. Meanwhile, in 2024 alone, the net loss for taxpayers was $85.3 million, which is a pretty penny! But since the costs were distributed across hundreds of millions of taxpayers, it only cost about each American one quarter annually. Taxpayers were the latent group in this case, since no one calls a congress member over 25 cents a year. Even the people most prone to penny pinching probably would not have thought twice about how printing pennies hurts their pocketbook.

It's the Economy, Stupid!

 How did Richard Nixon go from a staunch opponent of wage and price controls in July, 1971 to reversing his position just a few weeks later? The answer is relatively simple: he wanted to ensure his reelection the following November. Pres. Nixon was advised by his treasury secretary, John Connally, to impose these economic controls in order to demonstrate to the public that he was serious about curbing inflation. The imposition of price and wage controls can be characterized as political signaling to voters, not necessarily a policy initiative in the public’s best interest. Richard Nixon never once believed that these controls would actually fix inflation in the long run. To convince Nixon of their value, Sec. Connally and other proponents argued for the “cosmetic” effects of a freeze on prices and wages. In other words, Connally emphasized the perception of these policies as opposed to their genuine effectiveness. Additionally, because Nixon could only serve four more years in the Oval Office (assuming a victory next November), the long term effects of price and wage controls were weighed negatively against the desire to win the upcoming election. 


Nixon’s decision to impose these controls is a clear-cut example of a politician forming policy in order to win elections instead of the reverse. The question we should ask ourselves is if Nixon is unique or if all politicians use policy as a means of winning elections. As our old pal Milton Friedman put it, “Nixon had the capacity of rising above principle if politics demanded it.” Is this a fault of Nixon’s character, or is this a fault of the incentive structure embedded within American politics? The answer is likely both, but we would need a second blog post to answer this question in more detail. 


Corn and Garlic: Two Peas in a Pod


    Becker’s model of competition among pressure groups says that groups spend resources to maximize the benefit of those in their group, and the policy outcome depends on how effective each group's spending is. Like corn farmers in the U.S. , garlic is a clear example of pressure groups. The U.S. has had an antidumping order on Chinese garlic since 1994, and in 2018 a rancher named Ken Christopher, one of the last three commercial garlic producers in the country, traveled to Washington to ask that garlic be included in new tariffs. His reasoning was that the tariffs were happening anyway, so why not garlic. His lobbying was successful, and after a 10% tariff began in September 2018, his domestic sales rose 15% in the last quarter of the year, and the tariff went up to 25% in May 2019.

    As Becker predicted, pressure groups began to compete against each other and Garlic didn’t go unchallenged. McCormick, a huge seasoning company, argued against it before the International Trade Commission. McCormick pushed back and said its recipes depend on Chinese garlic, which it does not consider substitutable for the American kind. A small group of growers with a large stake faces a firm that bears the cost, and both spend on lobbying. Consumers, who saw a box of garlic go from $20 to $40, are left bearing unnecessary burden. McCormick and Chrispother are spending resources on things other than production causing dead weight loss.

You Really Should Be Tipping.

    I have been working in the service industry for about 2 years, and the other day I was working at Wing Wednesday as a server at Asado. After someone tipped me a fun $0.97, I started thinking about tipping culture in the US and how it relates to our discussion about pressure groups and lobbying.

    Groups like the National Restaurant Association lobby heavily to keep the “tip credit” system intact. They spend millions of dollars in political efforts to maintain the policies that set the federal and state sub-minimum wage for tipped employees. The National Restaurant Association’s lobbying efforts are very successful, with wins in 2023 that stopped legislation in 23 states from overturning the tip wage policy. However, according to Olson, larger groups are often unsuccessful when it comes to applying political pressure because of the free rider problem. Where the National Restaurant Association differs is their implementation of selective incentives in the form of membership benefits. By becoming a member of the group, members are given exclusive access to a team of regulatory experts/lawyers, economic research on the restaurant industry, and member discounts on products and health care. With these selective benefits and a massive eligible base in the nation’s second-largest private sector employer, the National Restaurant Association secures a large amount of funding. They use these resources to out-pressure less organized labor groups and effectively influence governments to maintain sub-minimum wage levels of around $2/hour (that really gets taxed out). So, unless you can out-lobby the NRA, please think twice before you decide not to tip after dining in a restaurant that provides table service.

Saturday, November 07, 2026

Daylight Savings Time

Every year, on the first Sunday of November and the second Sunday of March, the clock is either set back or set forward by an hour. According to polls in 2025, only 12% of Americans actually support daylight savings while 54% of Americans are ready to end the practice entirely. So why hasn't Congress done anything? 

Olson's logic of collective action helps explain this. Ending the clock change is a collective good; people benefit regardless of whether they contributed. Because each person's share of the benefit is so small, no individual has an incentive to bear the cost of organizing and would rather free ride off of everyone else. The group is also so large that not everyone agrees on how to end daylight savings: should the time be Standard Time or Daylight Saving Time? These complications make this a latent group, where no individual can affect what will happen.

On the other hand, Olson argues that smaller groups have lower organizing costs and larger benefits per member. This is why they are more successful in overcoming the free-rider problem and achieving their collective goal. For example, the candy industry lobbied to extend daylight savings to November, believing an extra hour of daylight would bring in more revenue. While for a candy company, an extra hour of daylight is an extra hour of revenue, for most Americans, it is a minor inconvenience that is not worth the cost of lobbying.

If Americans really want to end daylight savings, they would need to find a selective incentive to get organized so that they can actually achieve their goal. 

Rent Seeking in the NFL

Rent seeking behavior is common practice for large corporations with lobbying power. Although this occurs regularly in the political space, firms also compete for the right to display their logos on NFL uniforms. Nike, Adidas, and Under Armor are the official footwear providers of the league. Although other companies are licensed produce cleats that can be worn in NFL games, they are prohibited from displaying their logos. 

A new company called Caddix designs and manufactures cleats for high level athletes with patented SmartStuds technology. The cleats are supposed to reduce non-contact lower body injuries. NFL quarterback Caleb Williams believes in the technology so much that he has been fined over $30,000 across two games for wearing the cleats without covering the logo. Caleb Williams does not have a partnership with Caddix. 

This three-corporation cleat oligopoly dominates the NFL cleat market share, boxing out competition and impeding innovation. This imposes a clear external cost on players, exemplified by Caleb Williams who would rather pay $30,000 than wear nike cleats.

Trains in Spain: More Than Bad Luck?

On January 18, an Iryo train derailed near Adamuz, and an oncoming Renfe train crashed into it, killing 45 people. On October 28, a Renfe train hit the back of a stopped Iryo train in Toledo, killing 69. Accidents happen, but two deadly crashes in one year, on the same Madrid–Andalusia line, are hard to dismiss as bad luck. Both came only a few years after Spain ended Renfe’s monopoly and let private rivals like Ouigo and Iryo onto the tracks. Since then, much of Spanish rail's resources have gone into fighting over the market rather than improving it. Ouigo was accused of “price dumping,” the new entrants filed complaints claiming Renfe has unfair advantages, and Adif was accused of spending on new lines instead of maintaining existing ones.

The rent-seeking model we have seen in class can help explain what is likely happening. When the state controls something valuable, firms spend real resources trying to win or protect it, and those resources produce nothing. In Spain, the state owns Renfe (the largest operator), controls the tracks, and decides both who gets access and where to build new lines. Therefore, there is strong incentive to invest in lobbying, legal complaints, and visible new projects that bring political rewards. There is little incentive to invest in maintenance that voters never see. Although the crashes are still under investigation and no accusation can be directly made, the rent-seeking lens suggests that when effort goes into capturing rents instead of running a safe network, the costs eventually appear somewhere, and in Spain they may have appeared on the tracks.


Thursday, November 05, 2026

What Made the Wave Blue?

Tuesday’s midterm elections resulted in what many are calling a “blue wave.” Nearly every county in the nation saw Democratic candidates receive a higher share of the vote than in 2024. This resulted in several major seat flips from Republican to Democrat in traditionally red states, like Texas, Kansas, South Carolina, and Ohio. As we learned when discussing the median voter theorem, whichever party wins the middle voter wins the election. So, in the span of two years, did the median voter across the entire nation truly shift from more conservative to more liberal? I argue no. I believe the preferences of the median voter did not change that profoundly in the span of two years, but instead, the Republican Party increasingly alienated voters through extreme right-wing rhetoric and behavior, and the Democrats positioned themselves as a more moderate alternative. 

As we have also learned in this class, rational ignorance is a significant barrier to voters’ understanding of policy and elections. Since voters have relatively little incentive to research every policy and candidate, they likely rely on more visible and obvious signals about who to support. This means that not only did the Republican Party become more extreme ideologically, but it did so in ways that were seen and felt by everyday citizens. For example, Vivek Ramaswamy’s offensive attack ad during his Ohio gubernatorial campaign received bipartisan backlash and compelled many middle-ground voters to vote for his Democratic opponent, and Ken Paxton’s corruption controversies drove Texans’ support of James Talarico. In general, President Trump’s frequent association with billionaires undermined the Republican Party’s image as an advocate for “ordinary” Americans. Simultaneously, Democrats worked tirelessly to appeal to moderate voters. James Talarico underscored his seminary education and Christian faith, while other Democrats appealed to the relatable issues of affordability rather than ambitious progressive ideas. While some of these examples highlight candidate behavior and rhetoric as opposed to policy positions, I believe they signaled to voters what they could expect out of each party, and moderates felt that Democrats were more in tune with their priorities.