Ahead of midterm elections, President Trump has promised all U.S. adults $5,000 if republicans win the midterms, but does being paid $5,000 outweigh the costs of voting? For the sake of this analysis, I will be focusing only on the marginal benefit based on promises, not on the expected future utility stream under each candidate. We know that there is no financial promise being made by other parties running against Trump, so the marginal financial benefit of voting for Trump would be $5,000 for adults. Based on our discussion in class, we also know that the probability of being the decisive vote in Virginia is 1/10,000,000. Using these values, the expected benefit of voting for Trump purely based on the financial promises would be $0.0005, a number that is much lower than the marginal cost of voting. In a different state that historically votes blue, the probability of being the decisive voter is even lower, so the expected benefit is even lower.
While President Trump’s promise seems like a large sum, the expected value for the individual is much lower than the perceived benefit of the offer. If Trump is trying to target people who typically would not vote, this low of an expected benefit might not bring them out to the polls. This number could be swayed, however, if people miscalculate the probability that their vote will be decisive, increasing the perceived value of the promise.
On the other hand, we know that people do not always behave predictably when it comes to voting. In terms of straying from the Rational Agent Model, people consistently vote even when the costs of voting exceed the expected benefits of voting. For example, they could have a strong sense of civic duty or be highly influenced by social pressure. In these cases, social pressure could play a major role, especially if people view the $5,000 incentive as being paid out. On a similar note, people who vote for civic duty might be insulted by the offering if they consider their vote something very important that cannot be bought out or they could see the offer as “undemocratic.”
Saturday, October 17, 2026
Can Your Vote Be Bought?
Sunday, October 11, 2026
UBE's Mess of an Election
Pursuant to Section 7 Part C of the University Board of Elections Rules and Regulations, student election winners are determined through a Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV) System. The justification for utilizing this system is "to ensure the election of the candidate preferred by the most voters, avoid runoff elections, promote positive campaigning, and encourage greater voter turnout". However, looking at the 2024 First Year Council President Election results may provide evidence challenging the bold claim UBE makes that their system ensures the election of the candidate preferred by the most voters.
In the 2024 FYC President election, the ballot was initially a First-Past-The-Post, or plurality, system of voting due to a procedural error. In the event that this was the standard voting system of the UBE, Patrick Jo would have been elected the First Year Council President. However, due to the procedural error of the UBE in producing a ballot that was not consistent with the RCV system, they chose to "rectify" the situation by employing an RCV for the top two candidates.
In the pairwise election, I was thus named the successful candidate, demonstrating that Patrick Jo would not have been the Condorcet Winner, as he would not win every head-to-head candidate pairing. However, it is still possible that I was not the Condorcet Winner (and would not defeat every other candidate in a head-to-head vote), and that the decision to remove all the other candidates from the Runoff Election prohibited voters from revealing their true preferences for another candidate. If the UBE was truly trying to get as close as possible to electing the candidate most preferred by voters, they may elect instead to employ the Borda voting system going forward, which produces the Condorcet winner more often than the RCV system.
Concerning many during this election process was the UBE's decision to rectify their procedural error through a second round of runoff voting between the top two candidates. Prior to the publication of the top two candidates, some candidates felt that the additional time and mental exhaustion costs of a runoff were not worth it, and preferred to simply accept the results of the plurality system of voting, while other candidates wanted to stick it out to have the best possible chance of being elected President. Because a majority decision between candidates to not participate in the runoff election was essentially necessary to convince the UBE not to hold the second round, the majority decision (sticking it out through a second round of voting) imposed costs on the candidates in the minority who were exhausted and preferred not to continue campaigning.
Florida’s Pig-Headed Constitutional Amendment Process
Since 2006, Florida has required 60% of the vote to amend its state constitution. In most states, the legislature proposes and passes amendments to their state’s governing charter, and then submits the proposal to voters for final approval. And until twenty years ago, Florida was in the vast majority of states which required a simple majority for the enactment of constitutional amendments. Sentiment towards the policy began to shift in 2002, when an amendment passed prohibiting the confinement or tethering of pregnant pigs. Although the sympathy of voters is perhaps admirable, business interests were outraged. The Florida Chamber of Commerce began a campaign to raise the threshold to 60%, arguing that trivial amendments such as these not only “disrespect [the] democratic process,” but also harm underrepresented industries within the state. One swine farmer was awarded $500,000 in damages after the amendment passed, and countless others expressed frustration with the amendment. A referendum to increase the threshold to 60% passed just four years later.
Per the analysis of Buchanan and Tullock, the raised threshold sought to restructure the costs associated with the passage of constitutional amendments. In requiring a supermajority, the model suggests that external costs imposed by these collective decisions on Floridians have decreased, and otherwise affected pig farmers might have avoided the damages imposed by the amendment. In turn, the costs associated with building consensus have increased. Whereas a simple—perhaps naïve—majority might feel sympathy for pregnant pigs, requiring 60% means more expensive advertising campaigns and outreach efforts. Over a million additional Floridians in any given election must be persuaded to vote in favor of proposed amendments, many of whom are potentially negatively impacted (e.g., are pig farmers) and are thus much harder to convince than the first 50% of voters. Although constitutions should be immune to partisan ebb and flow, the failure of amendments which receive 57% of the vote (such as a pro-choice amendment in 2024) have sparked continued debate over the optimal placement of this threshold.
