Ranked Choice Chaos in Alaska

Alaskan voters recently affirmed their loyalty to Ranked Choice Voting, and it seems that this decision has the potential to sway a highly contested Senate seat...due to a split vote between current Senator Dan S. Sullivan (R) and retired teacher Dan J. Sullivan (R) who share similar names. Currently, the vote is projected to be neck and neck between Dan S. and Democratic challenger former Rep. Mary Peltola, with Dan J. grabbing just ~3% of the vote. 

However, one Republican interest group filed a complaint with the FEC claiming that Dan J.'s sole purpose in joining the election was to split the Republican vote and bring down Dan S., citing Dan S.'s illegal dealings with ad groups against Dan S. The name confusion is said to be enough to split the Republican vote. However, this is a complaint that rings true with a plurality system of voting like that of Nicaragua, not RCV. Here, the voters leaning towards the imposter Dan J. will almost certainly rank Dan S. as the second option, as a vote for Dan J. seems more like a statement vote than anything more substantial, but yet not enough of a statement to actually vote for a Democrat. 

In this sense, those using this situation to press the iron to RCV have little case. Of course, there is an opportunity to have voters rank Dan J, Peltola, Dan S. and actually split the vote, but this seems unlikely and insignificant (I hypothesize that anyone who votes for Dan J. is on the more extreme side of the political spectrum, and as demonstrated by the Hotelling-Downs Model, will not likely vote for Peltola before Dan S.). Perhaps Alaskans should be grateful for such a voting system that removes the incentives of a vote-splitter, as Dan J. running as an independent in our traditional election systems may actually hold sway (perhaps there is variability in voter preference between the election and the runoff to give an edge to Peltola) and avoid producing the Condorcet Winner.

Are Politicians Still Chasing the Middle Voters?

The Median Voter Theorem suggests that in a two-party, majority rule election, parties will have an incentive to move towards the median voter so that they can get the most amount of votes possible. But what happens when candidates change who the voters are instead?

As politics becomes more polarized and extreme, at least seven states have redrawn their congressional districts to help the party in power prior to the 2026 midterm elections, most favoring Republicans. This process of gerrymandering has reduced electoral competition, meaning that some individuals and groups are losing voting power. It has also created an interesting problem for the Median Voter Theorem. 

Neither the voters nor the candidates preferences have shifted. Instead, the distribution of voters has changed, shifting the location of the median voter and therefore, candidates vote-maximizing strategies. Redrawing the districts moved the median voter closer to the party in power, creating a margin of safety in case of abstention and making it unnecessary for incumbent candidates to moderate their policies. In Louisiana's 6th district, the Black voting population fell from 53% to 25%, shifting the median voter from a liberal to a more conservative voter, reducing the Republican candidate need to appeal to Black voters. 

Politicians are still trying to maximize votes, but by changing district boundaries, they changed the group they need to appeal to. If politicians can choose the voters they need to win, then they may not need to chase the moderate median voter anymore, which can have extreme effects on future elections and the shape of politics as a whole in America.

Is Bolsonaro Brazil's Condorcet Winner?

Condorcet winners seem like an optimist's dream - but finding Condorcet winners in elections is like trying to find a four leaf clover. But could there be one in the Brazil presidential election? Brazil runs its elections as majority rule with a runoff, so since no candidate reached 50% or more of the vote after the recent election results, Lula (incumbent) and Flávio Bolsonaro will be sent to a runoff election. Many of the candidates that received less than 3% of the vote are right of center, so Lula would likely not be the Condorcet winner since Bolsonaro is very right-wing. But does Bolsonaro have the makings of a Condorcet winner? 

There one way this is likely to go when comparing Bolsonaro with any of the minor candidates, including Cury. In an election between Bolsonaro and Cury, if all 47% of Bolsonaro's voters vote for him again, the 53% of other voters decides the election results. Bolsonaro would win the election if he gets a share of non-Bolsonaro voters such that: 47 +53*s > 50 =. s > 3/53=5.7%. Cury would need a share of 94.3% of all non-Bolsonaro voters to win, so it seems like Bolsonaro is a shoe-in for a Condorcet winner. 

To prevent Bolsonaro from becoming a Condorcet winner, 94.3% of all non-Bolsonaro voters would need to vote for Cury. Even though Lula's base is very anti-Bolsonaro, a 90%+ preference for Cury from all non-Bolsonaro voters seems unlikely. Strategic voting could have also caused understatements in the minor candidates' first-round support, which may mean that some Bolsonaro voters engaged in strategic voting and did not vote for Cury even though they liked him. With all that in mind, it still seems like this is a likely case where Bolsonaro is an elusive Condorcet winner.

Copper or Cooperation?

Online and in the news, you hear about the virtues of a “high trust society”. Japan in 2011 was noted for the lack of looting following the Fukushima disaster by both the BBC and NPR. Many attributed this lack of thievery in the wake of a natural disaster to Japan being a “high trust society”. 

An understanding of the prisoner’s dilemma tells you why a “high trust society” might be valuable. Simply put, the prisoner’s dilemma describes a scenario where uncooperative behavior, that constitutes a dominant strategy for both parties, can be deterred by government action to achieve a pareto optimal move whereby each party achieves a utility improvement via their joint choice of cooperative behavior. A world where cooperative behavior (looting abstention) does not need to be compelled by costly government action saves tax payer money and is therefore more efficient. 

On the other hand, one can see how an uncooperative society comparatively struggles. Either the parties reside at a pareto inefficient utility level, or the government has to continuously spend money to compel cooperative behavior. Neither of these are good. 

This understanding helps explain why so many say LA is failing. LA is experiencing unprecedented levels of copper wire theft from their street lights currently. Over 27,000 feet of copper wiring has been stolen since February of last year according to the LA Dept of Water & Power. Now, LA city officials are calling on Governor Newsom to pass AB1941 criminalizing “organized metal theft” for up to a year. Most US cities don’t even consider the need to deter infrastructure pilfering. LA must now do so to ensure its citizens can simply drive on lit roads.