Sunday, November 15, 2026

Airbnb VS The Hotel Industry

 Stigler's work tells us that regulation is the friend of the incumbent, and this could not be exemplified better than by Local Law 18 in New York City, passed in early 2022. Rising concerns about housing affordability lead policy makers to consider enforcing a much older law requiring short term rentals under 30 days to register with the city, of which only about 200 were permitted. If they were permitted, the host had to be in the apartment for the duration of the stay --- a de facto ban on Airbnb in NYC. Unsurprisingly, this was not a bill of pure intention -- the hotel lobby spent millions, 20 times more than Airbnb, on getting this regulation passed, surely not for the virtue of rent decreases. 

Post-regulation, the lobbying investment paid back dividends. Revenue in the industry increased by about $2.5 billion due to this regulation, and daily prices went up by about $17 a night without any meaningful change in cost. Regulation was captured well.

What's worse is that the rent failed to decline. It seems that a regulation of Airbnb's either forced them into illegal activity, or the supply of housing is so large that the apartments converted from short term rentals to actual homes was a mere drop in the bucket. Policy makers professed good intentions, yet they raised prices for consumers and handed barrels of cash to the hotel industry.

No Wasted Paper

After our class discussion about Weingast and Marshall’s paper on the benefits of the committee system, I decided to take a look at the Senate website to see a list of the different committees. Although there were some that sounded familiar, there were many that I didn’t even know existed, such as the Joint Committee on Printing.

Founded in 1846, the Joint Committee on Printing is one of the oldest joint committees in Congress, which means that it includes members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. It cannot bring bills to the floor, and instead, its responsibilities include overseeing the US Government Publishing Office and ensuring that federal agencies comply with “laws, rules and regulations designed to minimize printing costs to the American people.” 

At first, I was bemused that people would want to be on this committee. However, I then remembered Weingast and Marshall’s assertion that Congressional committees are made up of “preference outliers.” To be selected for the JCP, one must be on either the House Committee on House Administration or the Senate Committee on Rules and Regulations, suggesting that the individuals on the JCP might already care more than the average legislator that everyone in the government is following the rules. In more economic terms, they have a comparative advantage, because they perceive being on the JCP as having a lower net opportunity cost than their peers, who would rather spend their time on more influential committees. But as a taxpayer, I am grateful for the JCP’s hard work ensuring my dollars aren’t being wasted on excessive federal printing.


Denmark doesn’t need Committee Vetoes as an Enforcer



    Weingast and Marshall’s model says legislators can’t trust plain vote trades, because future legislatures aren’t bound by today’s deals, so Congress uses monopoly control through committees to make bargains stick. Studying abroad in Denmark, I was exposed to a whole different type of government. They have many different political parties and a much more homogenous population. Because of this, Denmark gets durability a different way, and the Green Tripartite is a clear example.

    In November 2024, Denmark’s major parties agreed on the details of the world’s first carbon tax on livestock emissions, starting in 2030. The deal was worked out by the government with part of the opposition and representatives of farmers, industry and unions, and even though the government already had a majority, it was expected to try to bring in more parties. The point is that a broad coalition is meant to keep the deal standing for many years. Using continued relation as an incentive to follow through and therefore the enforcer Weingast talks about. As the model would predict, someone is left out: one opposition MP said many people would lose their jobs. Farmers bear the cost, and the deal is politically binding, not legally binding. So Denmark isn’t enforcing the bargain with committee vetoes. It’s making sure nobody has a reason to break it.

All Roads Lead to Appropriations

Looking at the committees Rhode Island Senator Jack Reed (who lives in my hometown) serves on, I saw he serves on the Senate Appropriations Committee, which is considered one of the most powerful in Congress. It oversees federal government spending across virtually all policies from agriculture to defense. Since virtually every government program requires funding, the committee has influence across nearly every policy area and therefore gives its members considerably more power than those serving on committees with narrower jurisdictions. This creates opportunities for pork barrel spending, where legislators direct federal funds toward projects benefiting their constituents. For example, in 2005, per capita federal spending in Alaska was double the national average while its senator, Ted Stevens, chaired Appropriations (mentioned in source above). Reed is also the ranking member of its Financial Services and General Government Subcommittee, which makes him its highest-ranking minority-party member.

This relates to Weingast and Marshall's argument that legislators seek committee assignments based on their constituents' interests and incentives for reelection. Condition 2 of their model establishes a seniority system in which longer continuous committee service provides access to leadership positions. This helps explain Reed's position as ranking member especially given that he first joined Appropriations in 2001. They also argue that committees tend to be composed of preference outliers, which are legislators who have preferences for a particular policy jurisdiction more than the average legislator. However, Appropriations complicates this idea because almost every legislator has an incentive to bring federal spending back to their constituents regardless of their state's particular interests. Appropriations' broad jurisdiction makes it valuable to legislators with different preferences, which leads to increased competition for limited seats. W&M's bidding mechanism suggests legislators must weigh benefits of membership against their chances of securing a seat and opportunity cost of pursuing another committee. This leads me to wonder, since Appropriations benefits virtually every legislator's reelection prospects, are its members really preference outliers, or simply those who value access to federal spending the most?