Sunday, November 15, 2026

Denmark doesn’t need Committee Vetoes as an Enforcer



    Weingast and Marshall’s model says legislators can’t trust plain vote trades, because future legislatures aren’t bound by today’s deals, so Congress uses monopoly control through committees to make bargains stick. Studying abroad in Denmark, I was exposed to a whole different type of government. They have many different political parties and a much more homogenous population. Because of this, Denmark gets durability a different way, and the Green Tripartite is a clear example.

    In November 2024, Denmark’s major parties agreed on the details of the world’s first carbon tax on livestock emissions, starting in 2030. The deal was worked out by the government with part of the opposition and representatives of farmers, industry and unions, and even though the government already had a majority, it was expected to try to bring in more parties. The point is that a broad coalition is meant to keep the deal standing for many years. Using continued relation as an incentive to follow through and therefore the enforcer Weingast talks about. As the model would predict, someone is left out: one opposition MP said many people would lose their jobs. Farmers bear the cost, and the deal is politically binding, not legally binding. So Denmark isn’t enforcing the bargain with committee vetoes. It’s making sure nobody has a reason to break it.

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