Ideological PACs, Free-rider problem and Education Reform

This article discusses campaign contributions made by two national education groups that challenge teacher unions and their influence in the political arena. "Stand for Children" and "Democrats for Educational Reform," well-funded ideological political-action committees (PACs), have each spent a total of a few million dollars to support candidates that favor "overhauling teacher-tenure policies" and "tougher teacher evaluations." In order to challenge these attempts at education reform, the National Education Association, the largest teach union in the US, organized a 40 million dollar campaign. Although it would seem that a free rider problem would be hard to overcome as members have distinct individual preferences and there are 3.2 million members, the common goal of preserving their job and income creates a substantial economic incentive to contribute to the group. In an attempt to limit free-riding, the union tries to make sure that every member has a "personal discussion" with another member in which they encourage each other to vote for the cause and contribute. (http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/other-races/126401-teachers-union-expands-playing-field-for-mid-terms)

Overcoming the free rider problem seems to be more difficult in ideological PACs in which an economic-incentive isnt always obvious. It seems that the rational thing to do would be to free ride while hoping that policy change is achieved yet various education groups have contributed (and thus collected) thousands of dollars to campaigns. This indicates that ideology has to matter; how else was Jonah Edelman, the founder of "Stand for Children," able to persuade several buisness leaders to donate money to the cause. Perhaps they had some economic incentive but it seems that many contributors genuinely want to change policy for altruistic reasons; as Kau and Rubin put it, "these contributions show that many are willing to spend money to achieve non-economic goals." (153) George Stigler's hypothesis highlighting economic incentives and downplaying the importance of ideology has to thus be reconsidered. If individuals are willing to contribute to ideological PACSs and vote with similar goals in mind, then ideology has to be a factor explaining voter preferences.

As Kau and Rubin pointed out, legislators might be tempted to shirk because of contributions from different special interest groups and "thus shirk with respect to his constituents' desires, but in a way unrelated to ideology." A problem with understanding voter preferences though is that candidates are bundled goods. When people vote, we don't know if they are voting because of percieved candidates' positions on educational reform, health care or minimum wage. If politicians shirk in certain policy areas and not in others, how will we know what voters are thinking when they vote someone out of office? Although Toi Hutchinson, an Illinois state senator that recieved $100,000 from Stand for Children, might vote in favor of education reform, she might also vote in favor of additional stimulus. If she is not elected next term, we will not know precisely what ideologicl preference of the constituency swayed the vote!