Sunday, November 06, 2011

Occupying Olson

Stories about the Occupy Wall Street Movement have been crowding my newsfeed and leaving me confused for almost 2 months now. With little leadership, a stunning lack of unified demands, and some downright silly protesting strategies, this economics major continues to be puzzled that more and more Americans are finding it prudent to jump on board with OWS. However, for better or worse, OWS is continually managing to grow both in size and scope, and has even played a role in Obama’s recent endorsement of a bill aimed at increasing oversight and regulation in the financial industry (see the article here).

Thinking of OWS as an interest group and looking at it through the lens of Olson’s theories on group size and group behavior yields some interesting results. For one thing, the growth of OWS seems to defy the free-rider problem that Olson claims large interest groups have. If Olsen were correct, then we would expect the growth of OWS to taper off as politicians begin to take notice of their demands; after all, people supporting OWS’s stances will be able to free-ride and reap the political rewards of having politicians who are sensitive to their frustrations without actually having to protest themselves. This, however, has obviously not been the case, as OWS's success in gaining the attention of politicians has actually proved to draw more protesters to its side. The group’s growth and relative political effectiveness seems even more interesting when you consider that OWS is clearly a group for which political activity is a focus (rather than a byproduct), which again goes against Olson’s claims that large groups are most effective at exerting political pressure when political activity is only a byproduct of the group’s function.

While I think there is much more to be said about this topic, I regrettably have run out of space. However, I would like to open the floor to further discussion about this issue, either to expand on this (admittedly brief) analysis of how OWS seems to contradict Olson’s claims or to argue the converse.

3 comments:

Antonia Nguyen said...
This comment has been removed by the author.
Antonia Nguyen said...

Justin, your analysis here is really interesting. I think OWS is definitely a prime example of a total exception to Olson's theories on interest groups and collective action.
After reading the article, OWS definitely contradicts Olson's views in that it is becoming increasingly more organized over time as it gains more momentum and members, by going as far as "lining up medical aid and legal help and printing their own newspaper". The fact that OWS is able to get these funds together is quite impressive, and shows that they are truly a force to be reckoned with.
I think OWS's power comes from how strongly people believe in the cause they are fighting for, which is some sort of economic change. Camping out and constant protesting are definite indicators of how dedicated people are to the cause. However, Olson would probably argue that OWS's lack of true ideological unity is probably what makes it an exception to his model. Protesters in OWS do not really rally behind one particular solution for the economic issues they believe should be addressed, namely "unemployment and economic inequality." Because OWS does not have a clear or specific policy goal that it hopes to enact, there are no real conflicts with protesters' individual interests.
Nonetheless, OWS is certainly an interest group that Olson would really fear. Olson would certainly lose sleep over their exponential increases in power and influence.

(Sorry for the double post.)

Jeff Dean said...

I believe that there are definitely some interest groups out there that do not fit into Olson's theory. However, I would caution calling OWS an interest group because I believe that it should be categorized as a political movement. OWS is criticized for not having a clear and concise message, but that is because it is a political movement that has many different beliefs and areas of concern. This is similar to the Tea Party movement, which represents a series of different ideological beliefs. I would also argue that free-riding is not a problem for OWS because there is not a section of OWS that has greater stake in the issues than the rest of OWS. In other words, if OWS were to get legislation passed that strengthened financial regulation, the benefit individuals received in OWS from the legislation would be fairly even. No group of people would benefit significantly more than the other people in the group to a point where free-riding of those people with a great stake in the legislation would occur. OWS is a middle class movement, so they all have similar stake in having financial regulation. Also, because there are many issues that encompass OWS, there is less likely to be free-riding. While looking at OWS as an interest group offers interesting insights into Olson's theory, I believe that OWS, like the Tea Party, is more of a political movement, than concentrated interest group.