In class
last week, we talked about the interplay between Congress and government
bureaus, and looked at competing arguments about who has the power in the
relationship. Weingast and Moran concluded that Congress in fact has the upper
hand, and that the lack of an evident power just shows that its control is
effective. Between the committee system and the confirmation power of the
Senate, bureaus are limited in their autonomy. For a new bureau head to take
over, they must pass both their oversight committee and the Senate as a whole,
and that overlap may be small, disallowing a range of candidates.
On
Thursday, Democrats in the senate led a vote to change voting rules for
presidential appointments, and may have tipped some power back in the favor of
bureaus – and the president. Previously, presidential appointments to bureaus
could be filibustered by any member of the Senate, and any filibuster required
60 votes – or a “supermajority” – to end. Now, though, all non-Supreme Court
nominees cannot be filibustered, and will require only a simple majority to
pass. This significantly opens up the range of candidates that can be appointed
to lead bureaus. The new rules allow for “riskier” or more partisan picks, as
the majority can now more easily exert its power.
In class, we discussed Larry
Summers, who President Obama’s first choice for Federal Reserve Chairman but
ultimately pulled his name from consideration when it became clear that he
would not be confirmed by congress, possibly because of a lack of
supermajority. Under new rules, it could have been possible for Summers to
gather the 51 votes necessary to be confirmed. Instead, the less controversial
Janet Yellen was nominated, and will most likely be confirmed.
1 comment:
Stigler has the misconception that the ease with which appointments are approved in the Senate is a sign that bureaus are insulated, and autonomous. However as pointed out in the Weingast & Moran article, as well as lecture, this is merely a misunderstanding of the pricipal-agent problem at work. The Senate doesn't have to reject appointees often because those that would be rejected are never brought up. So, does this new proposal really change the dynamics between the Senate and the bureaus? I believe that this new proposal only changes the dynamics of whom is viewed as a candidate that will pass in Senate. This seems to echo the problem of tyranny of the majority, rather than the principal-agent problem. An appointee must still have a majority in the Senate, so there are still many possible appointees that the Senate would not approve. In the current government, the President and the Senate happen to be of the same party, which is the reason for an easy ride through appointment approval, not because the Senate is giving approval with a rubber stamp. The majority are able to impose their views more easily.
Post a Comment