Little Rocket Man and President Trump: Two International Prisoners

Over the past two years, news cycles have varied in intensity over the prospect of reaching an agreement to denuclearize North Korea. President Trump has taken it upon himself throughout the course of his first term to make "the best deal" with the DPRK. The situation at hand can be complicated, but by framing the issue as a simple prisoner's dilemma, it can be easier to understand. The two actors in this game are A) President Trump, and B) Little Rocket Man. Each actor has two choices. They can either choose to stay nuclear, or to denuclearize. Both President Trump and Little Rocket man have a dominant strategy to stay nuclear. If President Trump assumes that Little Rocket Man is going to denuclearize he would have a strong incentive to stay nuclear, because Little Rocket Man wouldn't have the means to force President Trump to give up the nuclear option. If President Trump assumes that Little Rocket Man is going to stay nuclear, he would have a strong incentive to stay nuclear because President Trump would need the nuclear option for leverage. The same incentives apply from Little Rocket Man's perspective. Both actors have a dominant strategy because regardless of what the other actor chooses, there is a higher payoff to stay nuclear.

There is a scenario where both actors can be helped without harming anyone else. If both actors chose to denuclearize, there would be no need to fear for impending doom, and both actors would be able to peacefully coexist, and save some money. Of course, this implication assumes that North Korea and The United States are the only international actors that pose a threat to anybody else, and that an international strategy of peace through strength would not be effective, but for our purposes, mutual denuclearization would yield a mutually higher payoff for both actors. A deal could be struck where a Pareto-Efficient policy move can be made where each actor chooses to denuclearize. Unfortunately, the system of incentives surrounding this prisoner's dilemma makes it so that without cooperation, the actors land on a Pareto-Inefficient equilibrium. Multiple different strategies or steps can be taken to fix this international market failure, including a better relationship between Little Rocket Man and South Korea, or Little Rocket Man and President Trump. Only time will tell, but as of recently, it is clear that President Trump and Little Rocket Man might be getting over their differences, and cooperation to denuclearize might occur in the future.