When playing 21 basketball at the
AFC or Dell Courts, I often find that myself and the other defender at any
given time tend to sag off the offensive player to hunt for the rebound if he/she
misses, which often leads to open shots and points for the offensive player. Although
our lackluster defense could be attributed to laziness and subpar physical
endurance, I like to believe that public choice offers a reason why we end up continually
making this bad strategic decision on the court. This situation is essentially
a prisoner’s dilemma.
Some assumptions
need to be made for this analysis to work. If Player A has the ball, defensive Players
B and C are actors in a prisoner’s dilemma. In this analysis, any points for a
player can be represented as negative points for the other players, who both
experience the cost of the score.
Let’s assume Player A is shooting a
2-point jump shot that goes in 33% of the time when undefended and 10% of the
time when defended. Therefore, an undefended shot for Player A will grant them
an average of .67 points, and -.67 points for both Players B and C. A defended
shot for Player A grants them an average of .2 points and -.2 points for
Players B and C. Also, possession of the ball gives 1 point per possession for
the average player. Therefore, a rebound is worth 1 point and -1 point for the
non-rebounding players.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma looks like
this:
B,
C
|
B defends the shot
|
B sags off and hunts for the rebound
|
C defends the shot
|
-.2, -.2
|
.8, -1.2
|
C sags off and hunt for the
rebound
|
-1.2, .8
|
-.67, -.67
|
If Players B
and C are fighting for the rebound on equal ground (either they both defended
the shot or both sagged off to hunt for the rebound), the 50% rebound chance
cancels out and grants them an additional 0 points. However, if Player B defends
the shot and Player C sags off and hunts for the rebound, either Player A makes
the defended shot or Player C definitely gets the rebound, which is the worst possible
outcome for Player B (-1.2 average points). Therefore, both players are
incentivized to sag off and hunt for the rebound to avoid this outcome, leading
to a Pareto-Inefficient Equilibrium of -.67 points from the undefended Player A
jump shot.
An enforcer would be necessary to
compel the defenders to both defend the shot to achieve the Pareto-Efficient Equilibrium
of -.2 points from a defended Player A jump shot. One enforcer could be
trash talk from Player A: pickup basketball players love taunting “you shouldn’t
have left me open!” when they make undefended shots, causing enough humiliation
to incentivize Player B and Player C to make the Pareto-Efficient Move and both
defend the shot.
No comments:
Post a Comment