Capture Theory and the FDA

 

               The Food and Drug administration is no stranger to controversy. Whether mass recalls on previously approved drugs, or shady transactions occurring after approvals, there seems to be a conflict-of-interest present. Big corporations, such as Monsanto, always seem to have allies on regulatory agencies, such as the FDA, questioning the validity of many safety measures taken. Such regulatory agencies have been “captured” in a sense, bowing to the wants of large corporations in exchange for compensation.

               One example of such an occurrence is the approval of the drug Brilinta, which reduces blood clotting, limiting the risk of heart attacks and strokes. After the approval of this drug, many officials responsible for the approval received hefty compensation from the company AstraZeneca. This is incredibly concerning, as the regulatory agency that determines what is permitted within production of consumable goods seemingly has been captured by corporate interests. What corners are being cut to reduce costs that the FDA just turns a blind eye to, due to the financial incentives? How can we trust the safety of our food when the overseeing body has incentives to led certain things slide? The principle-agent problem present in this situation is also clear. The American people (principles) wish for adequate regulation and knowledge about approved drugs and foods, while the FDA officials (agents) have incentives to overlook important factors in order to financially benefit. While the FDA has what the deem as “strong” conflict-of interest-assessments, shady transactions, such as those proceeding the approval of Brilinta, question the validity of these assessments, and the overall reliability of the organization.