In Defense of Procrastination

Consider a class at the University of Virginia. In this hypothetical class, the hypothetical professor carries out a strict anti-technology policy. In fact, on the first day of class, the professor accurately stated that the use of computers in class distracts classmates (see point #2 in the link), imposing a negative consumption externality on those sitting in the vicinity of the laptop user. I intend to show, however, that such a ban on technology usage is allocatively inefficient and, indeed, unjust. But before I continue, let me reaffirm that the class of interest here is a theoretical one, and is in no way intended to represent any one class. Especially not ECON 3330: Public Choice. Please don't hurt my grade.

In this class, consider two students, whom we may call Student A and Student B. Student A gets a certain amount of utility from using his or her laptop in class in order to avoid paying attention to Professor Copp - I mean, the hypothetical professor's lectures (personally, I think Student A should be paying attention, but who am I to judge someone else's utility curve?). As mentioned earlier, this creates a negative externality, as Student B is then distracted from the course material. But according to Coase's theorem, Student B may simply offer to pay Student A to refrain from using a laptop during class, and this free market transfer will inevitably lead to the socially optimal level of laptop usage.

In this case, both Student A and Student B are better off -- everyone is happy. Student A made a few bucks, and Student B is now able to pay attention in class. The professor's only role should be to determine that technology users are liable for the damages they inflict, allowing the invisible hand to bring us to the allocatively efficient level of output.

Again though -- and I can't stress this enough -- this is a generic exercise talking about a generic class, and I am definitely not Student A.